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Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to
another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him
by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to
compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to
be a magistrate[.]1
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE EXEGETICAL AND INTERPRETIVE RATIONALE
The Constitution is a legal document. 2 Its text was not composed in haphazard
fashion, nor were its terms fortuitously chosen. Its drafters were sober men, of
singular purpose, driven from the inception to construct a founding document
designed both to eradicate the faults exposed in the British system and to protect
against the ascendance of the caprice of tyranny over the rule of law.
The text of the Constitution is then bound unto itself, and the document derives
its very authority from text whose meaning is etched into history; whose context,
when apparent, dictates application; and whose application, when ambiguous, finds
support in the objective meanings attributed to such text, with reference to the
understandings of the drafters themselves, from the course of history, and from
normative rules of grammar and usage.3 This textual hermeneutic arises because the
words of the Constitution are, by their very declaration, supreme law. In fact, to
accept the supremacy of the Constitution (to which all legislative, executive, and
judicial members swear an oath of support), one must first accept the presupposition
that the Constitution’s text imbues the document with the very authority to grant its
1

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
(1689).

OF

CIVIL GOVERNMENT 202 (Russell Kirk ed., 1955)

2
Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech at the Annual Federalist Association, Charles Cuprill
Chapter (Feb. 13, 2006) (as reported by Melissa McNamara, CBS News, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/main1315619.shtml?source=RSS
&attr=_1315619 (last visited May 27, 2009)) (“The Constitution is not a living organism; it is
a legal document. It says something and doesn’t say other things.”).
3

Indeed, few terms in the Constitution are self-defining, and it is unquestionably the
proper role of the judiciary to give meaning to these terms where ambiguity exists. However,
construction of terms is a far cry from judicial addition, subtraction, and substitution of terms.
See infra Part I.
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proclaimed supremacy.4 Any other conclusion makes reference to the Constitution
secondary, because it improperly, and unnecessarily, binds constitutional text (in the
application) to some extrinsic body of law, the making of which thereby subordinates
text to judicial agency; the language of Article VI not only contradicts such an
outcome, but in fact proscribes it. Therefore, because the Constitution derives its
authority from the words of the document itself—from its status as Constitution—
and because Article VI mandates that no agency subordinate to the Constitution may
violate its authority (even if such agency be entrusted with what we now call judicial
review5), there can exist no legitimate constitutional law where such jurisprudence
“evolves” from any method of interpretive review that subjugates such text, or
creates “tests” or “standards” that supplant or substitute explicit text. If such be the
constitutional modality, then the authoritative meaning of that text, which sets forth
the very authority with which to invoke it, must not, and indeed cannot, suffer at the
protean attitudes, understandings, or protocol of nine unelected men and women, or a
majority or plurality of them. 6
And yet, two hundred and twenty-three years post, the text of this document has
indeed suffered at the hands of such men and women. Modern constitutional
jurisprudence and political thought hails such development as proof of an “organic,”
“evolving,” or “elastic” Constitution.7 The most common method of imposing such
4
See Vasan Kesavan, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History,
91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 (2003) (“To invoke the Constitution as authoritative requires that the
Constitution be taken on its own terms. To reject the basis on which the Constitution purports
to be authoritative and its own specification of what constitutes ‘this Constitution’ is to reject
any basis for invoking the Constitution as authoritative.”).
5

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

6

See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1986) (“What does it mean to say that words in a document
are law? One of the things it means is that the words constrain judgment. They control judges
every bit as much as they control legislators, executives, and citizens.”); see also Kesavan,
supra note 4.
7
This is not to say that a constitution should not evolve over time to address changes that
the passage of time inevitably brings and adapt to new developments in society or technology
(e.g., pornography, “virtual” property rights, email and the internet, electronic surveillance,
etc.), or changes in attitudes or morality. However, the Constitution as a legal document must
evolve or expand by interpretation or construction within its own parameters. Any evolution
undertaken by addition, subtraction, or substitution must occur by amendment—a designedly
difficult process. As Judge Bork (often accused of unwavering adherence to notions of
“judicial restraint” and “original understanding”) notes of the distinction between judicial
construction of existing terminology and the judicial creation of extra-constitutional
principles: any invalidation, on constitutional grounds, of an act of the “political branches”
must happen “in accord with an inference whose starting point, whose underlying premise, is
fairly discoverable in the Constitution.” Bork, supra note 6, at 826 (quoting JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-2 (Harvard University Press
1980)). Bork further clarifies this idea:
The important thing, the ultimate consideration, is the constitutional freedom that is
given into [judges’] keeping. A judge who refuses to see new threats to an established
constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision
of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial duty. That duty . . . is to
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elasticity occurs through the addition of words and phrases to the text of the
Constitution, thereby infusing it with both a meaning and an authority foreign to
itself.8 Thus, Fifth Amendment “liberty” becomes infused with vague notions of
“privacy,” and equal protection becomes divided into subparts of protected or
“suspect” classes. Ultimately, then, there emerges the development of wholly novel
concepts such as “substantive” due process and other extra-constitutional doctrines,
concepts evolving not from the text of the document but as authoritative “extra-text,”
thereby achieving an impossible dichotomy of being melded with the document and
yet altogether absent from it.9
More insidious, however, and therefore more difficult to discern, is the opposite
phenomenon: the disregard of explicit constitutional terminology, which being
ignored, become orphaned; once orphaned, the text becomes meaningless as law,
whereby, depending on a particular Justice or plurality of Justices, implicit terms
become substitutes for explicit text. Over time, these implicit terms, by rote, derive
their own explicit status, unquestioned, even unanalyzed; and so existing, thereby
acquire a surrogate or “shadow” constitutional validity, bearing a more authoritative
weight than the actual text itself. 10 These surrogates, possessing such illegitimate
rote authority, become imbedded within constitutional jurisprudence as superconstitutional inquiries that, like “ghoul[s] in . . . late night horror movies,” are

ensure that the powers and freedoms the framers specified are made effective in
today’s circumstances. The evolution of doctrine to accomplish that end contravenes
no postulate of judicial restraint.
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
8
In reality, the concept of an “evolving” Constitution is embodied within the document
itself and is therefore self-executing under the amendment provisions of Article V. However,
such a process is by design slow and difficult, and as a result does not serve as a convenient
means with which to “elastify” the language of the Constitution under the exigencies of any
particular case implicating its terms. This author posits one theory for this rationale, and an
explanation for why such improper—and at times illegal—wielding of judicial power does not
produce an outcry, or even a whimper, among the general populace, let alone the judiciary as a
whole. Oftentimes, the outcome of the case makes palatable the means by which such
outcome was reached; therefore, in cases with reprehensible facts, the public reaches a
collective recognition that, to use general parlance, “this cannot be right,” and therefore looks
to the judiciary to make it right. The outcome, when the judiciary does endeavor to make it
right, produces an accompanying collective consensus that justice has prevailed, the nature of
which either (1) prevents the public from questioning, or even analyzing, whether such justice
was reached in an improper manner; or (2) otherwise insulates the particular judge or judges
from any criticism for having so reached “justice” in a constitutionally impermissible manner.
9

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
31-32 (Free Press 1990).

OF

AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION

OF

THE LAW

10
Bork calls this phenomenon law by judicial “fiat” and “not law in any acceptable sense
of the word.” Michael W. McConnell, The First Amendment Jurisprudence of Judge Robert
H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 63, 65 (1987), quoted in Robert Bork, Forward to G.
MCDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, at ix (Center
for Judicial Studies 1985).
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killed, resurrected, and killed again, as would seem appropriate under the particulars
of any given case.11
The consequence of this phenomenon is twofold. First, ambiguous terms in the
Constitution, if they be ambiguous at all, become construed by extra-constitutional
concepts that, adopted on an ad hoc basis, themselves become susceptible to equally
ambiguous application, which application, in turn, supplants the text itself. 12 Second,
once supplantation occurs, these concepts impregnate the Constitution as part of
court-created inquiries, “standards,” or “tests” by which whole constitutional
provisions are construed and interpreted, and thereby become surrogate text, or
“supertext.”
Nowhere, in the opinion of this author, is this phenomenon more apparent,
nowhere is its weakness more exposed, and nowhere is its effect more divisive, than
in the Establishment Clause cases.13
Just as Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of
separation,” perhaps the best known or most revered surrogate,14 is now imbedded in
First Amendment jurisprudence in the sixty years following Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing,15 also imbedded are concepts of entanglement, endorsement,
11

Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
12

See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths and Principles”: The Danbury
Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and the “Wall of Separation”, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455, 456
(1997) (“Occasionally a metaphor is thought to encapsulate so thoroughly an idea or concept
that it passes into the vocabulary as the standard expression of that idea. Such is the case with
the graphic phrase ‘wall of separation between Church & State,’ which in the twentieth
century has profoundly influenced discourse and policy on church-state relations. Jefferson’s
‘wall’ is accepted by many Americans as a pithy description of the constitutionally-prescribed
church-state arrangement.”); see also DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 3 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2002) (positing that
the federal judiciary has found the wall metaphor “irresistible, adopting it not only as an
organizing theme of church-state jurisprudence but also as a virtual rule of constitutional law,”
and thereby supplanting actual First Amendment text).
13
Indeed, in the words of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, “Many of our . . . Establishment
Clause cases have been decided by bare 5-4 majorities.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107
n.6 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon
Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1176
(2006); Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Cutting-Edge Issues in Public Interest Lawyering: Strict
Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53, 53
n.1 (2005), citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, at xviii (Univ. N.C. Press 1994).
14
See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1 (Harvard University
Press 2002) (“Two centuries later, Jefferson’s phrase, ‘separation between church and state,’
provides the label with which vast numbers of Americans refer to their religious freedom. In
the minds of many, his words have even displaced those of the U.S. Constitution, which, by
contrast, seem neither so apt nor so clear.”). As will be discussed infra, such use of
substitutionary surrogates for explicit textual provisions of the Establishment Clause has
impeded clear textual analysis to the point of rendering such text meaningless, or at a
minimum, subordinate to its surrogate.
15

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Beginning with Justice Black’s opinion in
Everson, Jefferson’s wall of separation has become standard constitutional fare for layman,
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coercion, and neutrality—all surrogates for “establishment.”16 While the Court has
never attempted to create a textual surrogate for “religion,” it has nevertheless
recognized “symbolic” surrogates such as crosses, menorahs, or manger scenes;
“invocation” surrogates, such as prayers and so-called moments of silence;
“utilization” surrogates, such as sectarian use of public facilities; or “funding”
surrogates, such as printing allowances or school vouchers.17 However, from the
standpoint that “religion” is itself not an ambiguous concept, the Court has never
attempted to limit or expand its import beyond what it already would seem to
encompass by implication.18
Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence oscillates between no less than five
approaches—Lemon,19 endorsement, coercion, neutrality, and a “history and
traditions” approach last seen in Van Orden20 and McCreary County.21
Unfortunately, the Court applies none of these approaches consistently, cannot
decide which approach to utilize in any given situation, and even where it will use a
test, does not apply it uniformly. Furthermore, when expedient, the Court appears to
craft a hybrid of these approaches, e.g.: Lemon’s purpose and effect with
endorsement and coercion; neutrality as indicative of endorsement or Lemon’s
purpose; psychological coercion mixed with Lemon’s effect prong; and in its most
current form, a hybrid combining a history and traditions approach with Lemon’s
purpose/effects prongs, as indicative of neutrality. As this thesis posits, such an
inconsistent state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not only unsurprising, but
is altogether expected, as these tests, often created ad hoc, cannot be applied
uniformly, or exclusively it would seem. Even if they could, all present what can be
termed as “super-constitutional” or “supertextual” principles.
The Lemon approach, when even applied, is so detached from “establishment of
religion” that several Justices have labeled it unworkable and called for it to be
law student, and judge alike. In fact, as stated in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
242 (1968), “[t]he constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State.”
16

As will be discussed infra, the “entanglement” aspect is most closely aligned to the
surrogate concept of “separation,” and the concepts of “endorsement” and “coercion” at least
minimally align themselves with the actual text, “establishment.” However, none of these
concepts have been applied uniformly or consistently. Neutrality, by contrast, seems more of
an indicia of endorsement/establishment rather than a test thereof.
17
As will be discussed infra, such disparate use of surrogates lends itself to inconsistent
outcomes, and the myriad tests that derive therefrom are themselves not uniformly applied,
rendering Establishment Clause jurisprudence “inchoate if not incoherent.” EDWIN MEESE III,
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 304 (Mathew Spalding & David Forte eds.,
Heritage Foundation 2005).
18

For this reason, all Establishment Clause approaches analyze state action in terms of
“religion” without ever attempting to define religion, or at least to conceptualize it in some
fashion. Instead, such approaches merely presume its involvement. This begs the question,
addressed infra, as to what constitutes “religion” for First Amendment purposes.
19

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

20

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).

21

McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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overruled. The endorsement approach is the offspring of Lemon, and similarly lacks
any consideration of “establishment” as that term would necessarily imply some
affirmative stance taken by government carrying with it the force of law. The
coercion approach coexists with the first two approaches, albeit independently; and
while coercion appears to address the concept of legal compulsion, in practice, it has
instead relied upon considerations of the subjective, “psychological” effect of a
statute, policy, or practice on the complainant. History and traditions analysis, while
relevant as to the founders’ understanding of the meaning of text, remains helplessly,
and hopelessly, inconsistent, as it all too often leads to conflicting interpretations of
the same text. Neutrality lacks any constitutional basis whatsoever, and therefore
remains the most ambiguous of approaches.
This thesis proposes an approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence (and one
applicable to constitutional interpretation as a whole) that maintains fidelity to the
Constitution by confining the application and interpretation of explicit text to the
strictures of well-established norms of grammar and usage. It will begin by
analyzing the disparities created through the addition or substitution of super-textual
language to the clause through the use of surrogate concepts, and will demonstrate
that any such method of constitutional adjudication becomes unworkable and
incoherent once such tests utilize surrogate concepts and terminology. Through
grammatical exegesis will emerge the theory that the Religion “phrases” 22 do not
afford competing protections, and adhering most closely to the structure and
meaning of the Religion Clause as a whole, more specifically, with respect to the
grammatical interplay of its two adjectival subparts, the present participle phrases
“respecting an establishment of religion” and “prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”
a new normative meaning, a modality, emerges, where the Establishment “phrase”
becomes construed in its truest context, as an adjectival phrase modifying “law.”
This “linguistic modality”23 thus respects and maintains the integrity of the document
as drafted, and ensures that the words and context employed by the Founders—to
which indelible significance adhered at the moment of inscription—remain governed
by normative rules of grammar and usage (e.g., “Standard Written English”); only in
this way does the language of 1787/1791 become bound by the same semantic and
linguistic norms as bind the language today. In other words, this approach places a
type of “linguistic seal” upon the Constitution that allows judicial interpretation to
achieve consistent application within the parameters of modern society. Since
judges today are bound by the same rules of grammar and usage comprising standard
written English that bound the framers at the Constitutional Convention, this
linguistic approach seals the original structure of the text within the parameters of
modern application.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already demonstrated a willingness to employ
such an approach vis-à-vis the language of the Second Amendment in District of
Columbia v. Heller,24 wherein the Court analyzed the grammatical structure of the
Amendment and identified the text as setting forth a “prefatory” clause and an

22

See discussion infra Part IV.

23

Defined and discussed infra Part IV.

24

Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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“operative” clause, and then construed the former clause as giving meaning to the
latter. The Court also focused on the meanings of the individual terms contained
within each clause, i.e., “militia,” “right,” “people,” and “keep and bear Arms.”
Thus, the Court has at least laid the groundwork for the adoption of a new approach
to constitutional interpretation: one that utilizes the rules of grammar and usage,
rather than concepts of original understanding that are often hard to discern, so as to
reach decisions that adhere most closely to the text and meaning of the Constitution
as written.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHMENT25
Even before the creation of the Federal Constitution or state constitutions,
religious life in colonial America involved, to a large extent, ideas of “favored” or
“recognized” religions versus religious minorities. 26 Adherents to disfavored
religions became “dissenters” who were fearful that any dissent would unleash
penalty or punishment from the state, or at least, exclusion from the benefits
bestowed upon the “favored” believers. 27 The Founders were thus more concerned
with securing religious liberty, as opposed to segregating government from
religion,28 and to this end, from the standpoint of dissent, affording protection against
government reprisal—either direct (punishment) or indirect (exclusion). 29

25
The following is but a brief recitation of the history of religious establishment in the
colonies and serves as both a description of the environment existing at the time the
Constitution was drafted and ratified and as a backdrop for the language chosen in the First
Amendment Establishment Clause. For a more detailed view of establishment in the colonies,
see Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003).
26
This concept has been recognized by the Court in its “endorsement” approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence—an approach particularly espoused by Justice O’Connor
discussed infra Part III.B.3.
27

See HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 9-10:
The dissenters were the adherents of minority denominations that refused to
conform to the churches established by law. The established churches (Episcopal in
the southern states and Congregationalist in most New England States) were
established through state laws that, most notably, gave government salaries to
ministers on account of their religion. Whereas the religious liberty demanded by
most dissenters was a freedom from the laws that created these establishments, the
separation of church and state was an old, anticlerical, and, increasingly,
antiecclesiastical conception of the relationship between church and state. As might
be expected, therefore, separation was not something desired by most religious
dissenters or guaranteed by the First Amendment. Indeed, it was quite distinct from
the religious liberty protected in any clause of an American Constitution, whether that
of the federal government or that of any state.

28

This religious liberty, of course, is also protected by the Free Exercise Clause; however,
early concerns involved not so much the freedom to practice one’s religion as they did the
notion of the social ostracism descended upon a disfavored sect and, to a lesser extent, the
denial of privileges or status given to “established” religions.
29

See HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 89-107. The states with established religions
originally imposed penalties on those holding dissenting viewpoints. These states ended
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Any examination of this concept of “establishment” must occur within this
context. In light of the colonial history, the drafters of the Constitution deliberately
chose the word “establishment” over a more generic or even more comprehensive
word; such choice was not accidental. 30 Furthermore, the founders understood the
phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” to have particular import at drafting,
one designed to protect against the establishment of a national religion, the likes of
which the founders had experienced firsthand in Great Britain and the likes from
which many citizens had escaped in other European countries.31 Notwithstanding
this, prior to the American Revolution the Anglican Church was officially
established in the five southern colonies, and more often than not, Puritanism (i.e.,
Congregationalism)—out of favor in England—was the established church in most
New England colonies, Rhode Island excepted.32
Of course, the Religion Clause of First Amendment itself clearly states,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the Free Exercise thereof . . . .”33 The drafters employed this language, as generally
understood at the time, principally so as to afford a two-tiered protection: (1) against
the establishment of a national religion on the one hand, and (2) against any

sanctions but instead enacted specified privileges for their established denominations—
notably, salaries for the established clergy. Against such establishments, dissenters sought not
only a freedom from penalties (whether in terms of the “freedom of worship” or the “free
exercise of religion”) but also guarantees against the unequal distribution of government
salaries and other benefits on account of differences in religious beliefs. Some dissenters even
demanded assurances that there would not be any civil law taking “cognizance” of religion.
As a result, the colonial constitutions drafted to accommodate the antiestablishment demands
of dissenters guaranteed religious liberty in terms of these limitations on government—
specifically, limits on discrimination by civil laws. Id.
30
Some delegates urged either stronger or weaker language; e.g., “Congress shall make no
law touching religion” or taking “cognizance” of religion. HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at
106-07.
31

Germany, Scandinavia, France, and Holland had established religions in one form or
another. See McConnell, supra note 25, at 2107.
32
Id. at 2115-16. With respect to usage as to the various religious denominations, Judge
McConnell provides a concise explanation at footnote 54:
The term “Anglican” did not come into contemporaneous use until the eighteenth
century, but I use it here as a shorthand for the Church of England prior to
Independence. The term “Episcopalian” was sometimes used in reference to the
Church of England prior to Independence, but I will reserve it to refer to the American
successor to the Church of England after Independence. I will use the term “Puritan”
to denote the congregational Reformed Protestantism of New England in the hundred
or so years after settlement, and the term “Congregationalist” to denote the same
church after the mid-1700s, when it had lost the theological and behavioral rigor that
is associated with the term “Puritan.” I will use the term “Calvinist” or “Reformed” to
encompass not only Puritans and Congregationalists, but also Presbyterians, Dutch
Reformed, Independents, and other denominations whose theology derives from the
thoughts of John Calvin.
Id. at 2115 n.54.
33

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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concomitant disestablishment of existing state religions. 34 Prior to victory over Great
Britain, nine of the thirteen colonies had established churches, and at the time the
First Amendment was adopted, several states continued to recognize some form of
religious establishment.35
Thus, the idea of “establishment”—both from the colonial standpoint and at the
drafting of the federal Constitution—encompassed, and was understood to entail,
much more than just official “recognition” of a particular church or sect. In
particular, for the Southern colonies, religious establishments consisted of laws
compelling religious observance, providing financial support for the ministry,
controlling the selection of religious personnel, dictating the content of religious
teaching and worship, vesting certain civil functions in church officials, and
imposing sanctions for the public exercise of religion outside of the established
church. This was the model throughout the South, although the systems in the
Carolinas and Georgia allowed for greater toleration of dissention. 36
In New England, establishment resembled less the Anglican models in that its
structure was based on locality, i.e., centered around the particular convictions of the
townsfolk rather than a central church. This is significant only from the standpoint
of the scope of establishment; in New England, there was local establishment,
whereas in Virginia, state establishment. 37 New England also differed from the
Southern colonies in that Congregationalism was the established faith; thus,
members of the Church of England were considered the dissenters (the dissenters in
the Southern colonies were the established faith in New England, and vice versa).
Prior to the Revolution, New England engaged in the practice of punishing
dissenters; however, because the dissenting Anglicans in New England still wielded
political power back in England, this policy never quite reached the harshness of the
policy in the South, particularly, Virginia. 38
Whatever the nature and extent of establishments existing in the Colonies prior to
the Constitution, all involved, by necessity, one common element: official promotion
and recognition by the governmental authority. As stated by Judge McConnell: “An
establishment may be narrow (focused on a particular set of beliefs) or broad
(encompassing a certain range of opinion); it may be more or less coercive; and it
34
A disestablishment of a state religion would be, in effect, an exercise of denominational
or sectarian favoritism on the part of the federal government, whether in the form of aid,
subsidy, or recognition. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 13, at 55 n.9 (quoting LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988) (“A growing body of
evidence suggests that the Framers principally intended the establishment clause to perform
two functions: to protect state religious establishments from national displacement, and to
prevent the national government from aiding some but not all religions.”); see also
McConnell, supra note 25, at 2109. See generally MEESE, supra note 17, at 303.
35

McConnell, supra note 25, at 2107.

36

Id. at 2119. It must be noted that the most extreme model of establishment, that which
was found in Virginia, eventually broke down or dissipated by the time of the American
Revolution; however, even such dissipation did not end the official church in Virginia until the
state enacted the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1786. Id. at 2120.
37

Id. at 2121.

38

Id. at 2124-26.
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may be tolerant or intolerant of other views. During the period between initial
settlement and ultimate disestablishment, American religious establishments moved
from being narrow, coercive, and intolerant to being broad, relatively noncoercive,
and tolerant.”39
Establishment itself requires an object, i.e., the establishment of something or
someone. Given the historical context in which the Founders viewed “religion,” it
can best be described as what I will call religion in a “hard” sense, meaning: if a
“church” or a “religion” were established (in the sense described by McConnell),
then it perforce required that something, or some set of ideas, be not only set forth,
but set forth definitively, with the full endorsement and backing of the state. If there
be punishment of dissent, there must be something from which the dissent derives.
If there be compulsory church attendance, there must be a church to which
attendance is compelled. Or if there be political favoritism for members of an
established religion, there must be something with which to determine membership
therein, and who the favored are. All these factors, then, from the Founders’
perspective, and from the history of what was being established, would not only
imply, but require, adherence to a defining creed, a hierarchy of authority, and a
teaching of doctrine and orthodoxy, within the context of establishment.40 And while
some colonies may have tolerated dissent more readily than others, the dissenters, if
they be dissenters, become so by virtue of their refusal to adhere to certain doctrine,
orthodoxy of faith, and recognition of proper church authority (e.g., Catholicism and
the Pope, the Anglican Church and the monarch, etc.). 41
39

Id. at 2131. Judge McConnell goes on to list six common characteristics of laws
constituting establishment:
Although the laws . . . were ad hoc and unsystematic, they can be summarized in six
categories: (1) control over doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; (2)
compulsory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on worship in
dissenting churches; (5) use of church institutions for public functions; and (6)
restriction of political participation to members of the established church.’
Id.
40
For example, in New York—originally a Dutch settlement—local congregations
selected their own ministers, but the “Classis” assembly in Amsterdam retained control over
clerical qualifications and enforced adherence to the doctrinal orthodoxy of the Reformed
Church. Id. at 2129-30. When the English took control of the colony, notwithstanding the
tolerance shown to the Dutch church, the Duke of York nevertheless established a Protestant
church. Id. at 2130. New York continued to recognize the Dutch Reformed churches
(derivatives of Calvinism), until eventually, the Governor of New York mandated that all four
of New York’s counties “call[], induct[], and establish[], a good sufficient Protestant
Minister.” Id. Thus, while establishment itself might change, each subsequent establishment
requires adherence to a doctrinal orthodoxy of some sort. See id.
41

The purpose of this paper is not to reach a determinative definition of “religion” as such,
but rather to establish the proposition that “hard” religion may be the subject of establishment
for Establishment Clause purposes while “soft” notions of religion may not. In fact, “soft”
notions of religion are not religion at all with respect to the Establishment clause (discussed
infra). This process is by no means some academic exercise; it is a governing principle
derived from the text of the Constitution itself. For a more academic and detailed discussion
of “religion,” see Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ.
L. REV. 181 (2002).
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III. JUDICIAL CONCEPTS OF ESTABLISHMENT—SURROGATE TERMS AS SUPERTEXT
A. The “Wall of Separation”
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court had little opportunity to
address, let alone interpret, the Establishment Clause, and as such, generated little
substantive case law on the topic.42 While as early as 1879 the Supreme Court
referenced, as a definitive phrase, Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor in
Reynolds v. United States,43 it did not go so far as to adopt it as controlling, extratextual language until seven decades later, in Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing.44 Everson involved, among other things, a constitutional challenge to a New
Jersey statute that authorized local school districts to make “rules and contracts” for
the transportation to and from school for those children living “remote” from a
schoolhouse. The statute excluded schools operated for profit but did not exclude
other private or parochial schools.
Acting pursuant to the statute, the Board of Education of Ewing promulgated a
rule authorizing reimbursement to parents who had, at their own expense, arranged
public bus transportation to school for their children. The Board authorized part of
the money to be used to reimburse those parents who sent their children to Catholic
schools. Plaintiff Everson brought suit in his capacity as a district taxpayer,
challenging the statute on various constitutional grounds, both state and federal,
including the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court, after a
lengthy discussion of the history and rationale underlying the adoption of the
Establishment Clause, and after determining that the Fourteenth Amendment made
the First Amendment applicable to the States, held that the statute at issue did not
constitute an establishment. The Court set forth its Establishment Clause analysis as
requiring separation between church and state:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a

42

See Robert L. Cord, Book Note, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and
Current Fiction, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1509 (1984); see also ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 108 (Lambeth Press 1982); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 n.1 (1992) (discussing pre-Everson cases); Elizabeth A.
Harvey, Case Note, Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Squeeze the Lemon Test
Out of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 302 (2001).
43

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto.) 145, 164 (1879). This “wall of separation”
was originally penned by Jefferson in a January 1, 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association, some 11 years after the ratification of the First Amendment. Dreisbach, supra
note 12, at 1. While, again, this paper does not undertake a discussion or analysis of either the
text of the letter or the meaning Jefferson gave to such “wall,” the actual phrase may not have
originally been Jefferson’s in the first place. See HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 38-45;
Dreisbach, supra note 12, at 71-72.
44

Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between
church and State.”45
In sum, the Court concluded that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state,” and “[t]hat wall must be kept high and impregnable.” 46 Therefore,
the Court “could not approve the slightest breach.” 47
The statute at issue did not violate the Establishment Clause. 48 While the Court
was careful to strike a balance between state action that aided or supported a
religious institution on the one hand versus a denial of such aid that would in effect
“hamper” citizens in the free exercise of their religion on the other, the Court
nevertheless found an implied mandate of neutrality: “[the First Amendment]
requires the state to be . . . neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.” 49
Apparently, the Court in Everson was persuaded that the New Jersey statute did
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause given that the “aid” rendered to parents
sending their children to parochial schools was equally rendered to parents of public
45

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. In Everson, the Court for the first time held that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment applied to the States through the
“incorporation” doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 15. Not surprisingly, after
Everson, Establishment Clause litigation mushroomed. However, despite citing Jefferson’s
“wall” metaphor, and the additional language that such wall must remain “high and
impregnable,” the Court nevertheless concluded that the New Jersey statute did not “breach”
the wall. Id. at 18. In so doing, the Court recited at length the experiences of the American
colonists of various religions and the underlying rationale behind the adaptation of the First
Amendment. Id. at 8-13. It is interesting to note that the Court’s recitation described what can
accurately be termed the “evils and dangers” of true “establishment,” and in that regard,
Everson remained more faithful to the text of the First Amendment than has often since
occurred. Equally noteworthy, the Court qualified or recognized the establishment of religion
“by law,” which qualification has since been ignored or abandoned. See id. at 12 n.12.
46

Id. at 18. The Court did not cite Jefferson’s wall as a starting point, or as law, but rather,
as a descriptive metaphor; nor did the court create surrogate language to replace
“establishment” or religion, in the sense of creating extra-constitutional principles; however, it
did add to that metaphor, describing the wall as “high and impregnable.” Id. at 16, 18. In any
case, as will be discussed infra, such judicial restraint has not remained in subsequent
decisions.
47

Id. at 18.

48

Id. at 17.

49
Id. at 18. As will be discussed infra, the concept of neutrality has no place in
Establishment Clause analysis.
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school children. While New Jersey could provide transportation to public school
children, it could not, in the name of protecting the citizenry from the specter of an
“established” church, prohibit the extension of the general benefits of its laws to
citizens on the basis of religion. Conversely, New Jersey could extend such benefits
to the general public without regard for religious belief, so long as the aid rendered
fell neutrally on all citizens. Concomitantly, the denial of a neutrally-applied aid to
parochial schools, aid “so separate[ly] and so indisputably marked off from the
religious function [of such schools],” would hamper the ability of those schools to
function where they otherwise could exist under state law, an outcome “obviously
not the purpose of the First Amendment.”50
Despite its limited scope, Everson set the groundwork for today’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.51 In so doing, it began a line of reasoning and constitutional
jurisprudence that abandons concepts of establishment and religion and embraces the
surrogate concepts of neutrality, entanglement, and endorsement, which are often
confused and/or equated with the concept of “separation.” 52 Unfortunately, the
Court’s treatment of “separation” has evolved from the neutrality expressed in
Everson to the “aggressive separation” reached in later years. 53

50

Id.

51

See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Mythical “Wall of Separation”: How a Misused
Metaphor Changed Church-State Law, Policy and Discourse, 6 FIRST PRINCIPLES, June, 23,
2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/fp6.cfm (“In the half-century
since this landmark ruling, the ‘wall of separation’ has become the locus classicus of the
notion that the First Amendment separated religion and the civil state, thereby mandating a
strictly secular polity. The trope’s continuing influence can be seen in Justice John Paul
Stevens’s recent warning that our democracy is threatened ‘[w]henever we remove a brick
from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government.’”) (quoting Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
52
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 889 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Alembik, supra note 13, at 1185; Harvey, supra note 42, at 307-08 (applied to
cases with government aid to facilities including religious institutions, and Rosenberger’s
neutrality test); see also Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County
v. ACLU, 71 MO. L. REV. 317, 317, 337-38 (2006).
53

“Aggressive separation” as the term is used here conveys the role undertaken by the
Court as a sentry posed at Jefferson’s wall, gun in hand, ready to repel any intruder upon the
wall’s keep. As such, the Court began to strike down both laws and government practices that
it felt too closely aligned government with religious subjects, the result being the creation of
extra-textual safeguards to accomplish this end, be they proscriptions against entanglement or
endorsement or the mandate of complete neutrality. See infra Part III.
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B. Paradigms of Separation—Aggressive Separation
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman
The birth of this “aggressive separation” took place some fifteen years after
Everson, in the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.54 The Court, expanding on
Everson, attempted for the first time to furnish a decisional “test” out of what it
termed the “opaque” language of the Establishment Clause. 55 In so doing, the Court
derived its test “with reference to the three main evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,’” such ideals
“gleaned” from criteria “developed by the Court over many years.” 56
Lemon involved a constitutional challenge to two separate Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island statutes that provided state aid to church-related elementary and
secondary schools. Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute at issue provided financial
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in the form of
reimbursement for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional
materials incurred by such schools in connection with specified secular subjects.
The state reimbursement, funded by state taxation on cigarettes, applied only to those
courses also “presented in the curricula of the public schools.” 57
Similar but not identical to the Pennsylvania statute, the Rhode Island statute
authorized the state to directly subsidize, in the form of a salary supplement, “an
amount not in excess of 15%” of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects 58 in
54

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). However, even the Lemon Court
acknowledged that “total separation” between church and state was not possible “in an
absolute sense.” Id. at 614. Nonetheless, cases subsequent to Lemon have recognized that the
Lemon test has been disproportionately used to reflect unwarranted hostility to religion.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 665 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
55

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also Harvey, supra note 42, at 303; Alembik, supra note
13, at 1177-78.
56

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
Interestingly, in finding these “many years,” the Court cited (in addition to Everson) a mere
two cases—both decided within three years—reciting the “cumulative criteria developed by
the Court over many years” so as to craft its new test. Id. Furthermore, it is unclear where the
Court found such development over many years, given, as stated supra note 45, the Court,
prior to Everson in 1947, had little opportunity to address the Establishment Clause, and
never, prior to Everson, applied it to state action. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 861 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
57

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (West 1971)
(repealed 1977)). The statute was passed to address a perceived “crisis” in Pennsylvania’s
nonpublic schools due to rising costs relating to “purely secular educational objectives.” Id. at
609 (citation omitted). The Court found that, since the inception of the statute, some five
million dollars had been expended annually to nonpublic schools, of which over 96% were
“church-related,” mostly Roman Catholic. Id. at 610.
58

Id. at 607. Any teacher who taught a subject not offered in the Rhode Island public
school system was not eligible for the supplement; furthermore, any teacher receiving the
supplement was prohibited from teaching any religious subject. Id. at 608.
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nonpublic elementary schools. Such supplement was paid directly to the teachers.
However, the Rhode Island statute also provided that, as supplemented, a nonpublic
schoolteacher’s salary could not exceed the maximum paid to public school
teachers.59 It was undisputed that under both statutory schemes, state aid had been
given to “church-related” educational institutions.60
The Court struck down both statutes as unconstitutional establishments of
religion. In so doing, the Court initially examined the actual text of the
Establishment Clause, finding it “at best opaque.”61 The Court paid particular
attention to the “respecting” aspect of establishment, and concluded that the
Establishment Clause forbade those laws that constituted “a step that could lead to .
. . establishment” even if such laws “[fell] short of [establishment’s] realization,” 62
thereby broadening the scope of the term “establishment” to encompass laws that
might fall short of establishment and yet nevertheless respect an establishment. 63
This being the case, the Court now had to develop criterion with which to
determine such an outcome. Consisting of three parts, the Court adopted a test as a
hybrid of two previous cases, School District of Abington v. Schempp64 and Walz v.
Tax Commission,65 and mandated that:
(1)
(2)
(3)

the statute at issue must have a secular legislative purpose (the “purpose”
prong);
the statute’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; (the “effects” prong);
the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion (the “entanglement” prong).66

Applying this test to the statutes at issue, the Court found that neither the
Pennsylvania nor Rhode Island statutes violated the purpose prong. 67 With respect to

59
Id. at 607. The Rhode Island statute was based on a legislative finding that “the quality
of education available in nonpublic elementary schools has been jeopardized by the rapidly
rising salaries needed to attract competent and dedicated teachers.” Id.
60

Id. at 606.

61

Id. at 612.

62

Id. at 612.

63

Other cases have referred to the “tendency” toward the establishment of religion. See,
e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64

School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (involving the reading of
Bible passages in public schools).
65
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 664 (upholding a tax exemption for places of
religious worship).
66

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. These prongs exist as freestanding propositions, not
conditionally precedent on the others nor in any way conjunctively construed—any one of
which, if found to exist, would constitute establishment and invalidate the law at issue. See
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987); Harvey, supra note 42, at 305.
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the effects prong, the Court, while stating that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
programs “approached, even if they did not intrude upon, the forbidden areas under
the Religion Clauses,” nevertheless declined to determine whether the principal or
primary effects of the statutes infringed upon the proscribed advancement or
inhibition of religion.68 The “entanglement” prong, however, became the Court’s
basis for striking down the laws at issue. In so doing, the Court held that the
“cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State”
involved the “excessive entanglement between government and religion.” 69
2. Lemon Neglected, History Examined—Marsh v. Chambers
The Court began its selective retreat from the Lemon inquiry twelve years later in
Marsh v. Chambers.70 Marsh involved a constitutional challenge brought by several
Nebraska legislators to the practice of their legislature opening each legislative
session with prayers delivered by a state-paid Presbyterian chaplain. The district
court found that the prayer itself did not violate the Establishment Clause but that the
act of paying the chaplain with state funds did, and entered an injunction barring
such expenditure of public money. 71 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down the entire practice as violative of the Establishment Clause and enjoined both
the prayer and the funding. 72 On certiorari, the Supreme Court limited its review to
the constitutionality of opening legislative sessions with prayers led by stateemployed clergy, and held that neither the act of having a clergyman open legislative
sessions with prayer, nor the act of paying him to do so, violated the Establishment
Clause.73

67
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (“Inquiry into the legislative purposes . . . affords no basis for a
conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion.”).
68

Id. at 613.

69
Id. at 614. When examining a statute under the entanglement prong to determine if
government entanglement is in fact “excessive,” the Court will consider “the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and
the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.” Id. at 615.
The Lemon Court concluded there were, essentially, two forms of entanglement: (1) a state
statute or program might involve the state impermissibly in monitoring and overseeing
religious affairs; or (2) a state statute or program might have the potential to create a political
atmosphere divided along religious lines. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798-99
(1983). It bears noting that, given the disjunctive nature of the three-part test, whether the
Court even needed to craft the purpose and effect prongs, considering the foregone conclusion
that if a statute at issue was found to violate these first two prongs, it would, perforce, violate
the entanglement prong as well. Thus, the entanglement prong is not only a catchall prong but
it also, in effect, engulfs and swallows and merges with the first two. As such, the
entanglement prong stands alone and achieves the surrogate status of constitutional text.
70

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

71

Id. at 785. The district court also barred the collection and publication of such prayers at
the state’s expense. Id. at 785 n.3. That part of the decision was not appealed. Id.
72

Id. at 785-86.

73

Id. at 793-95.
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In reaching its decision, the majority did not reference Lemon or employ its threepronged approach. Rather, the majority analyzed legislative prayer from the
perspective of the historical and traditional practices of the Founding Fathers during
the opening session of the First Congress, and at the outset noted that “[i]t can hardly
be thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint
and to pay a chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First
Amendment for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of
the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable,” and with respect
to the Nebraska practice at issue, that “it would be incongruous to interpret that
Clause as imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the
draftsman imposed on the Federal Government.” 74
While the majority
acknowledged that “[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary
violations of constitutional guarantees,” it nevertheless afforded great weight to the
“unbroken practice” of both the federal and state legislatures in finding that the
Nebraska practice was more a “tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country” than an impending threat of establishment of
religion.75
3. Contextual Neutrality and the Origins of Endorsement—Lynch v. Donnelly
The Court’s next phase of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the evolution
of “separation” as interpretive doctrine, occurred in Lynch v. Donnelly.76 Lynch
involved a Christmas display owned and maintained by the City of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island and situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and annually
erected by the city. Apart from the usual Christmas fare, the display also contained a
crèche, or Nativity scene, which had been part of the display for over forty years.
The crèche itself consisted of traditional figures for such a display, including the
infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, shepherds, angels, kings, and animals, all ranging in
height from five inches to five feet. 77
Residents of Pawtucket and the Rhode Island affiliate of the ACLU brought suit
in United States District Court challenging the inclusion of the crèche in the
Christmas display. The district court held that inclusion of the crèche violated the
Establishment Clause, and a divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.78 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.79

74

Id. at 790-91.

75

Id. at 790, 792. The majority also gave due consideration to the fact that legislative
prayers involved adults rather than, say, schoolchildren susceptible to “religious
indoctrination.” Id. at 792. In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan dismissed the history and
tradition approach as “wrong” and chastised the majority for not deciding the case under
Lemon. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent summarily rejected legislative prayer
as unconstitutional, finding the “religious” purpose of legislative prayer to be “self-evident.”
Id. at 797. Furthermore, the dissent found that the primary effect of legislative prayer is
“clearly religious.” See id. at 797 n.4.
76

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).

77

Id. at 671.

78

Id. at 672.
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, recognized, while the First
Amendment was designed to prevent the intrusion of either religion or government
into the provinces of the other, “total separation” was not possible. 80 In so
recognizing, the Court believed that the “wall of separation,” while a useful
metaphor, was “not a[n] . . . accurate description of the practical aspects of the
relationship that in fact exists between church and state.” 81 The Court also
recognized that “the Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church
and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all
religions and forbids hostility toward any.” 82
The Court also paid particular attention to the contemporaneous understanding of
the framers as to the guarantees afforded by the Establishment Clause. The Court
noted that the First Congress (whose members had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention), in the same week it approved the Establishment Clause
as part of the Bill of Rights, enacted legislation providing for paid chaplains for the
House and Senate.83 The Court afforded the constitutional decisions of the First
Congress the “greatest weight” as an interpretive mechanism. 84
The Court went on to discuss the significance of religion in many of the nation’s
holidays, namely, Thanksgiving and Christmas, and acknowledged that Congress
had authorized the President to proclaim a national day of prayer each year, “on
which [day] the people of the United States may turn to God in prayer and
meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.”85 The Court also found
historical accommodation of religion in Presidential proclamations commemorating
Jewish Heritage Week and the Jewish High Holy Days. 86 The Court declined to take
a “rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause” in light of historical examples
of accommodation, and limited its analysis “to determine whether, in reality, it
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” 87
Despite its refusal to adopt an “absolutist view,” the Court nevertheless seemed
resigned to the conclusion that “no fixed, per se rule can be framed,” and that “the
purpose of the Establishment Clause was to state an objective, not to write a

79

Id.

80

Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).

81

Id. at 673.

82

Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 315 (1952) and Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948)). This notion that accommodation bears
any relevance to an Establishment Clause stems from the Court’s misperception as to the
relationship between the Establishment phrase and the Free Exercise phrase. See infra Part
III.D.
83

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 677 (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 169h (1994), amended by 36 U.S.C. § 119 (2000)).

86

Id. (citing Proclamation No. 4844, 3 C.F.R. 30 (1982) and 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1058 (Sept. 29, 1981)).
87

Id. at 678 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 671, 669).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

19

722

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:703

statute.”88 The Court thus refused to be confined to any single “test or criterion,”
citing Lemon but declining to apply it to the facts before it. 89 Rather, the Court
focused on the crèche wholly within the context of the Christmas season, and
whether the state action had any secular purpose. After reviewing cases where the
Court had invalidated state action on the grounds that a secular purpose was found
lacking,90 the Court turned to the crèche at issue and found that, while itself a
religious symbol, when analyzed in the entire context of the Christmas display and
the Christmas season generally, the city’s inclusion of the crèche in the display
served an appropriate secular purpose, given the historical significance of the
Christmas event in the context of the history and traditions of the country. 91
The Court also declined to consider inclusion of the crèche as conferring a
substantial and impermissible benefit upon religion in general, and the Christian faith
in particular. The Court reasoned that the crèche conferred no more of a benefit
upon religion than did state-supplied textbooks to church-sponsored schools,92
expenditure of public money for transportation to ecclesiastical schools, 93 federal
grants for college buildings of religious colleges combining religious and secular
education,94 noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities,95
tax exemptions for church properties,96 and Sunday Closing Laws.97 The Court
concluded that any benefit to religion or Christianity bestowed by the presence of the
crèche was “indirect, remote, and incidental.” 98 Given the minimal amount of money
expended on maintenance of the crèche, the Court also found no administrative
entanglement between religion and government. 99

88

Id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).

89

Id. at 679.

90

See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding a state statute requiring the posting of
Ten Commandments on public classroom walls invalid for lack of secular purpose); Abington,
374 U.S. at 205 (holding invalid a state statute requiring daily Bible readings in public
schools; Bible readings not part of a secular school curriculum but rather motivated wholly by
religious considerations); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding daily invocation
of God’s blessings mandated by city’s board of education and read aloud over public school
address system are “wholly inconsistent” with the Establishment Clause notwithstanding
students’ right not to participate).
91

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683-85.

92

Id. at 681 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)).

93

Id. at 681-82 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 1).

94

Id. (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)).

95

Id. (citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)).

96

Id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 664)

97

Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).

98

Id. at 683.

99

Id. at 683-84.
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Most significant about the Lynch case was Justice O’Connor’s separate
concurring opinion, wherein for the first time she espoused a “clarification” of the
Lemon doctrine, often called the “endorsement” approach to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.100 In particular, Justice O’Connor saw two principal ways that
government action could “run afoul” of the First Amendment: (1) “excessive
entanglement with religious institutions,” which (a) “may interfere with the
independence of [such] institutions,” (b) afford such institutions “access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents,” and (c)
“foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines”; and (2)
“government endorsement or disapproval of religion,” which O’Connor saw as a
“more direct” infringement on the First Amendment. 101 According to O’Connor,
government endorsement of religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.” Government disapproval of religion, on the other hand, would send the
opposite message.102
O’Connor proceeded to apply her proffered approach to Lemon’s three prongs.
With respect to the entanglement prong, O’Connor expressly limited the analysis to
“institutional entanglement.”103
O’Connor refused to extend the idea of
entanglement to any “political divisiveness” created by such religious displays,
stating flatly that “political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an
independent test of constitutionality,” and that the constitutional inquiry “should
focus ultimately on the character of the government activity that might cause such
divisiveness, not . . . the divisiveness itself.”104 With respect to Lemon’s purpose and
effect prongs, O’Connor’s inquiry focused on the notion of endorsement,
specifically, (1) what the city of Pawtucket “intended to communicate” by inclusion
of the crèche (purpose), and (2) irrespective of intent, what message the city’s
inclusion of the crèche actually conveyed to observers thereof, based both upon the
objective message sent and the subjective meaning attributed by recipients of such
message.105
In “clarifying” Lemon, O’Connor stated that under the purpose prong, the
analysis should focus not on whether the state action at issue possessed some secular
purpose, but rather, whether the state, by virtue of the activity, intends to convey a
general message of “endorsement or disapproval of religion.” 106 O’Connor found no
intent to convey or promote a religious message with respect to inclusion of the
crèche, but only intent to “celebrat[e] . . . the public holiday through [use of]

100

Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

101

Id. at 687-88.

102

Id. at 688.

103

Id. at 689.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 690.

106

Id. at 691-92.
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traditional symbols.”107 O’Connor rejected the notion that a determination of intent
could be made independent of a consideration of the overall purpose of the display at
issue. O’Connor found that the celebration of public holidays has cultural
significance even if it also has religious significance; for this reason, she found
inclusion of traditional symbols to be within the parameters of a legitimate secular
purpose.108
Turning to the “effect” aspect of the endorsement analysis, O’Connor similarly
rejected the notion that the effect prong of Lemon required invalidation of
government action merely because such action in fact causes, even as a primary
effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.109 Instead, O’Connor looked to
whether the state action at issue had the effect of conveying a message of official
endorsement or disapproval of religion to the extent that the state action makes
religion relevant, in reality or in public perception, to status in the political
community.110 O’Connor found the display at issue did not communicate a message
of governmental endorsement of Christianity. 111 O’Connor reasoned that the overall
holiday setting of the display, while not of itself sufficing to neutralize the religious
significance of the crèche, nevertheless “changes” what viewers of the crèche would
fairly understand to be the purpose of the crèche, i.e., to celebrate a traditional
holiday using traditional symbols of that holiday, and not an endorsement of the
religion from which the holiday originates. 112
The dissent, while acknowledging that the Religion Clauses of the Constitution
had “proved difficult to apply,” nevertheless looked to the Lemon test for guidance in
“assessing whether a . . . governmental practice involves an impermissible step
toward the establishment of religion.” 113 The dissent chided the majority for its
“less-than-vigorous” application of Lemon, and opined that the familiar traditions of
the Christmas holiday could not justify departure from the precedent set by Lemon.114
Applying Lemon, the dissent found both a religious purpose to the crèche as well as a
primary effect of (1) advancing the government’s “imprimatur of approval,” and (2)
conferring the “prestige of government” on Christian beliefs associated with the
crèche.115 Finally, the dissent found that inclusion of the crèche in the Christmas
display fostered an excessive entanglement between government and religion in that
other religious groups would invariably begin to petition Pawtucket for inclusion of

107

Id. at 691.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 691-92.

110

Id.

111

Id. at 692.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

114

Id. at 696.

115

Id. at 701 (citing Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982)).
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their religious symbols in the display, such requests the city would then be
compelled to accommodate.116
C. The Wall Reinforced—Lemon’s “Fourth Prong”
1. Endorsement Supplants Lemon—Wallace v. Jaffree
In Wallace v. Jaffree,117 the Court addressed three Alabama state statutes: the first
authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools “for meditation”;118
the second authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools “for
meditation or voluntary prayer”;119 and the third authorized teachers to lead “willing
students” in prescribed prayer to the “Almighty God” as “Creator and Supreme
Judge of the world.”120
A parent of three schoolchildren challenged the constitutionality of the statutes
and sought to enjoin their operation. The district court found no constitutional
infirmity with the first statute but concluded that the latter two were “an effort on the
part of the state of Alabama to encourage a religious activity.” 121 Nevertheless, the
district court refused to find them unconstitutional, holding that the state of Alabama
had the power to establish a state religion if it so chose. 122 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, holding the second and
third statutes unconstitutional.123 The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect
to the constitutionality of the second statute, section 16-1-20.1, which authorized a
one-minute period of silence for “prayer and meditation.” 124
116

Id. at 702.

117

Wallace v. Jaffrey, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985).

118

Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1984)).

119

Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984)).

120

Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1984)). The text of 16-1-20.2 also contained a
declaration that “the Lord God is one”; the actual text of the prescribed prayer therein
contained the following supplication:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world. May your justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound
this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the
sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord.
Amen.
Id.
121

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41 n.5 (citing Jafree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala.
1982)).
122
Id. at 41 n.6 (citing Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala.
1983)).
123

Id. at 41 n.7 (citing Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535-39 (11th Cir. 1983)).

124

Id. at 45 (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982)). The Court had previously
unanimously affirmed the finding by the court of appeals as to the unconstitutionality of the
third statute at issue, ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1984) (invocation of “Almighty God” as
“Creator and Supreme Judge of the world”). See Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924, 925 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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At the outset, the Court flatly rejected any notion that the state of Alabama could
constitutionally establish any religion. 125 With respect to section 16-1-20.1, the
majority of the Court examined what it once again termed “criteria developed over
many years” and cited the three-pronged approach of Lemon and found that section
16-1-20.1 violated the purpose prong.126 However, in applying the purpose prong,
the Court enmeshed the analysis with O’Connor’s endorsement analysis first set
forth in Lynch, stating that “[i]n applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask
‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.’” 127
Under the revised standard, the Court determined that ample evidence existed in the
record to support a conclusion that section 16-1-20.1 lacked any secular purpose
whatsoever.128 In particular, the Court found the addition of the words “voluntary
prayer,” the legislative history, as well as trial testimony from state legislators,
indicative of but one purpose, i.e., to “return voluntary prayer to the public
schools.”129 Most significantly, while the majority cited Lemon and purported to
apply its three-pronged approach, the majority nevertheless focused the analysis on
whether the Alabama statute amounted to an unconstitutional endorsement of
religion.130 Citing Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, the
Court held:
For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious subject, one of the
questions that we must ask is “whether the government intends to convey
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.” The wellsupported concurrent findings of the District Court and the Court of
Appeals—that § 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of state
approval of prayer activities in the public schools—make it unnecessary,
and indeed inappropriate, to evaluate the practical significance of the
addition of the words “or voluntary prayer” to the statute. Keeping in
mind, as we must, “both the fundamental place held by the Establishment
Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which
Establishment Clause values can be eroded, we conclude that § 16-1-20.1
violates the First Amendment.131
After a separate concurring opinion by Justice Powell wherein he argued for
continued adherence to Lemon, Justice O’Connor again reaffirmed her call to clarify
or rework Lemon, as first set forth in her concurring opinion in Lynch.132 O’Connor

125

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48.

126

Id. at 56.

127

Id. (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

128

Id.

129

Id. at 57-60.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 60-61 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91, 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(footnotes omitted).
132

Id. at 67.
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reiterated previous statements by the Court that “it is far easier to agree on the
purpose that underlies the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their
application.”133 She also noted that, while she was “not ready to abandon all aspects
of the Lemon test,” she nevertheless opined that application of the Lemon test had
proven “problematic,” and strove to accomplish more than to merely “erect a
constitutional ‘signpost’ to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our
predilections may dictate.”134 Rather, she sought to craft a standard for constitutional
adjudication “that is not only grounded in the history and language of the first
amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent application to the relevant
problems.”135
In O’Connor’s view, the endorsement/disapproval approach encompassed the
first two prongs of Lemon in that it “requires courts to examine whether
government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys
a message of endorsement.” 136 As such, endorsement analysis did not preclude the
state from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account when making
law and public policy; it did, however, preclude government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion, or a particular religious belief, is
favored or preferred by the state. The latter would place the “power, prestige and
financial support of government . . . behind a particular religious belief,” thereby
creating an indirect but nonetheless “coercive pressure” on religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing religious sentiment.137 O’Connor stressed that under the
endorsement analysis, legislatively mandated moments of silence, without more,
would not likely violate the Establishment Clause; however, O’Connor was careful
to point out that moment of silence legislation, either as drafted or as implemented,
could theoretically favor a child who prays over a child who does not, especially
where a teacher might exhort the schoolchildren to use the allotted moment of
silence for prayer.138
Chief Justice Burger wrote the dissenting opinion. He termed the majority’s
holding “curious,” and criticized the analysis under both the Lemon and endorsement

133

Id. at 68 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 694).

134

Id. at 68-69.

135

Id. at 69 (quoting Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1963)).
136

Id.

137

Id. at 70 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 431).

138

Id. at 73-74. O’Connor rejected the argument made by the State of Alabama that
allowing for moments of silence and voluntary prayer amounted to nothing more than an
adjustment to the school schedule to meet sectarian needs, and that it was permissible under
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14. O’Connor felt that while allowing for moments of silence might
constitute such an “adjustment,” moments of silence coupled with encouragement to pray by
the State “converts an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority
to use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a religious
exercise.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74 n.2 (citing Abington, 374 U.S. at 226).
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approaches.139 With respect to endorsement, Burger argued that to make an
Establishment Clause distinction between legislation allowing a moment of silence
and legislation allowing a moment of silence during which a student may engage in
prayer “manifests not neutrality but hostility toward religion.” 140
Justice Rehnquist offered a more vigorous dissent. Rehnquist cited Everson141
and what he termed the “exegesis” of Establishment Clause doctrine and the “wall of
separation” metaphor as first quoted in Reynolds v. United States.142 Rehnquist flatly
asserted, “[i]t is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause
has been expressly freighted with Jefferson’s misleading metaphor for nearly 40
years.”143 After a lengthy review of the drafting of the Establishment Clause, the
history of the Constitutional Convention, and the ratification process, Rehnquist
concluded the Establishment Clause forbade only government preference among
religious sects or denominations and did not require absolute neutrality on matters
religious.144
From his recitation of the history of the Establishment Clause, Rehnquist flatly
rejected the continued viability of separation as a constitutional touchstone, declaring
it “all but useless” as a guiding principle of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and
that its “greatest injury” was “its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual
intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights.” 145 To Rehnquist, the “wall” metaphor
was historically inaccurate, based on “bad history,” “useless as a guide to judging,”
and should be “explicitly abandoned.”146 Rehnquist next characterized Lemon’s
three part test as adding “mortar” to Everson’s wall, thereby implying that Lemon
compounded the mistake made in Everson.147 Rehnquist faulted the Lemon test as
historically unsound, continued adherence to which would inevitably cause fractures
within the Court and produce “unworkable plurality opinions.” 148 In the end,
Rehnquist discarded Lemon and with it “the mists of an unnecessary metaphor.” 149
139

Id. at 85.

140

Id.

141

Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.

142

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.

143

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

144

Id. at 106.

145

Id. at 107.

146

Id. Of course, while Rehnquist cast doubt on the wall metaphor, his explication of the
history of the Establishment Clause did not lead him to the conclusion that, as a textual matter,
any use of the wall metaphor amounted to the creation of extra-constitutional language. Id.
147

Id. at 108.

148

Id. at 110.

149

Id. at 112. In this passage, Rehnquist indicated that he would not follow the
“neutrality” approach to the Establishment Clause that would eventually arise in the Court.
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844; Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677 (2005).
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2. Endorsement, Fracture, and the Birth of Coercion—County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Rehnquist’s predicted “fracture” of the Court proved true in the watershed case of
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,150 where O’Connor’s
endorsement approach finally garnered a plurality of the Court. Allegheny involved
a challenge brought by the American Civil Liberties Union and several individual
residents of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, seeking (1) to permanently enjoin the County
of Allegheny’s display of a crèche containing a banner reading “Gloria in Excelsis
Deo” within the confines of the county courthouse, and (2) to enjoin the City of
Pittsburgh from displaying a Chanukah menorah located outside the City-County
Building alongside the city’s forty-five foot decorated Christmas tree and a sign
bearing the mayor’s name and entitled “Salute to Liberty.” 151 The district court,
relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, denied the injunction and entered judgment for the
county and the city.152 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing
Lynch v. Donnelly and holding that both displays constituted an impermissible
governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism under Lemon v. Kurtzman.153
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part the
decision of the court of appeals.
In a jaggedly divided decision, consisting of seven parts each joined by different
Justices, the Court held that the crèche at issue violated the Establishment Clause but
that the menorah did not. The majority’s exact approach is difficult to ascertain as to
a decisional rule of law; nevertheless, the Court adopted O’Connor’s endorsement
analysis, at least as a starting point, seemingly replacing the analysis under Lemon’s
effects prong.154 While the majority found the Lynch decision useless as a matter of
guiding precedent, it found O’Connor’s concurrence had set forth a “sound analytical
framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.” 155 The Allegheny
majority thus found two constitutional principles emerging from O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lynch: first, a flat rejection of any notion that the Court would
tolerate even minimal endorsement of religion; 156 second, a “sound” method for
determining whether the government’s use of an object or symbol with religious
meaning, whether standing alone or as part of a larger display, would constitute or

150

County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

151

Id. at 581-82, 588-89. Beneath the title of the sign read: “During this holiday season,
the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are keepers of
the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.” Id. at 582.
152

Id. at 588.

153

Id. at 588-89.

154
Id. at 590. The Court has stated that “[t]here is no need here to review the applications
in Lynch of the ‘purpose’ and ‘entanglement’ elements of the Lemon inquiry, since in the
present action the Court of Appeals did not consider these issues.” Id. at 594 n.45. O’Connor
in fact proposed combining Lemon’s purpose and effects prongs into her endorsement
approach. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
155

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.

156

Id.
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otherwise convey the endorsement of religion. 157 Implicit in this analysis would be
what effect the religious object would have on the ordinary observer thereof, or
stated alternatively, the subjective message the state’s use of the object fairly sends
to the ordinary observer.158 This question would turn, then, on the overall setting in
which such object appears, be it in a museum gallery, a Christmas display, a
classroom decoration, etc. As a result, the analysis would become one applied on a
case-by-case basis such that each challenged use of a religious object would be
“judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it [endorses] religion.” 159
In a lengthy footnote, the Court explained the differences between the approach
taken by the majority in Lynch and the approach taken in O’Connor’s concurrence,
stressing that O’Connor’s approach would allow government acknowledgment of
religion only so far as such recognition would serve as a means to “solemniz[e]
public occasions” or recognize “what is worthy of appreciation in society,” and not
amount to government approval of a particular belief. 160
The majority then turned its analysis to the crèche display within the County
Courthouse. At the outset, the Court rejected the arguments of the county and the
city that religious symbols must be shown to be coercive before they would run afoul
of the Establishment Clause. 161 Rather, the Court found sufficient the purely passive
display of religious symbology, a more or less “silent” endorsement. 162 Of particular
concern to the Court was the display’s lack of neutralizing elements, such as were
found in Lynch.163 The Court refused to find the presence of neutralizing displays of
Santa Claus and other secular decorations displayed in other parts of the courthouse
convincing; apparently, for the Court, the proximity of religious elements with
secular elements became a deciding factor.164 Equally relevant under the Court’s
analysis was the placement of the crèche itself—the Court concluded that given the
crèche’s display at the Grand Staircase of the courthouse, “[n]o viewer could
reasonably think that it occupies this location without the support and approval of the
government.”165 The Court found government endorsement notwithstanding the
presence of a placard indicating that a Roman Catholic organization, and not the city
or the county, owned the crèche.166 Finally, it rejected arguments that the crèche was
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

160
Id. at 595 n.46. The Court has never adopted any method by which to make such a
distinction; nevertheless, terms such as “approval” are so far removed from textual language,
and so much broader in scope, as to become impossible guideposts for anything other than
naked judicial power to strike down any particular state action.
161

Id. at 597 n.47.

162

Id.

163

Id. at 598.

164

Id. at 598 n.48.

165

Id. at 599-600 n.50.

166

Id. at 600-01.
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a permissible symbol of Christmas as a national holiday, stating that the government
may not celebrate Christmas in such a way that “endorses Christian doctrine.” 167
Justice Kennedy, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia joined, dissented with respect to the crèche display, concluding that it did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 168 The dissent noted the Court’s previous rulings
that demanded state neutrality towards religion, lest any government recognition of
religion confer an “imprimatur of state approval,” to a point requiring a “relentless
extirpation of all contact between government and religion.” 169 The dissent felt that
the majority’s endorsement approach, which depended heavily upon context and
perception, would unduly and in fact uncharacteristically require the government “in
all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion and so to
the detriment of the religious.”170
Kennedy’s dissent examined previous decisions and gleaned from them “two
limiting principles” that guided Establishment Clause cases. 171 Guided by these
principles, the dissent fashioned a rule that stood in stark contrast to the majority’s
open-ended endorsement approach:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may
not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact “establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” These two principles, while
distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be difficult indeed to establish a
religion without some measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the
form of taxation to supply the substantial benefits that would sustain a
state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing. 172
The dissent viewed the endorsement approach as a “novel theory,” and the Court’s
growing reliance on it as becoming “a permanent accretion to the law.”173 As such,
the dissent endeavored to demonstrate that the endorsement approach was both
“flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.” 174 The dissent stressed that
the meaning of the Establishment Clause must derive not from the impressions
occasioned upon the “reasonable observer” but rather determined by reference to
historical practices and understandings. 175 The dissent saw the First Amendment as
167

Id. at 601.

168

Id. at 655.

169

Id. at 657.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 659.

172

Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted).

173

Id. at 669.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 670. Reference to historical practices must relate to “those conducted by
government units . . . subject to the constraints of the Establishment Clause. Acts of ‘official
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“a rule, not a digest or compendium,” and its application not to be premised on the
objective feelings of some fictional “reasonable observer,” and whether he or she
might be made to feel “like an outsider” to the body politic that is government. 176 As
the dissent pointedly stated, “[i]f the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect
individuals from mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative prayer [or exhortations
to prayer made by the President] cannot escape invalidation” under the endorsement
test.177
Apart from its history and traditions criticism, the Allegheny dissent further
criticized the “endorsement-in-context” approach to government use of religious
symbolism as creating a “jurisprudence of minutiae”:
A reviewing court must consider whether the city has included Santas,
talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other secular symbols as “a center of
attention separate from the [religious symbol].” After determining
whether these centers of attention are sufficiently “separate” that each
“had their specific visual story to tell,” the court must then measure their
proximity to the [religious symbol] . . . [as well as] the prominence of the
setting in which the [religious] display is placed . . . . Deciding cases on
the basis of such an unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable
with the imperative of applying neutral principles in constitutional
adjudication.178
The dissent then concluded by stating that the majority’s approach transformed the
Court into a “national theology board,” such that the application of a “strict
separationist view” of prohibiting any acknowledgment of religion would produce a
consistency of application preferable to the endorsement approach. 179 In any event,
decisions regarding the inclusion of religious symbols in holiday displays would best
be left to local legislative officials; if such inclusion offends the body politic, then
the proper remedy for such offense lies at the ballot box, and not through the
hammer of constitutional promulgation.
3. Coercion Unbound—Lee v. Weisman
Kennedy’s coercion model controlled the outcome in Lee v. Weisman.180
Weisman involved a constitutional challenge to the practice of including prayers and
benedictions during school graduation ceremonies. Specifically, school principals in
the City of Providence, Rhode Island invited members of the clergy to offer
invocation and benediction prayers as part of the formal graduation ceremonies for
middle school and high school students. Such practice was permitted by the
discrimination against non-Christians’ perpetrated in the 18th and 19th centuries by States and
municipalities” become “irrelevant” to this inquiry, but the practices of past Congresses and
Presidents are “highly informative.” Id.
176

Id.

177

Id. at 673.

178

Id. at 674-76.

179

Id. at 678.

180

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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Providence School Committee and the Superintendent of Schools, and many
principals elected to have clergy deliver the prayers during the graduation events. As
part of this custom, Providence school officials supplied the clergy with a pamphlet
entitled “Guidelines for Civic Occasions.” 181 This pamphlet recommended that
prayers delivered at nonsectarian civic ceremonies be done with “inclusiveness and
sensitivity,” but also admonished that “prayer of any kind may be inappropriate on
some civic occasions.”182
In June 1989, Nathan Bishop Middle School’s principal, Robert E. Lee, invited
Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to deliver prayers at the graduation exercises. 183 Rabbi
Gutterman received the instruction pamphlet and was advised by Lee that his prayers
should remain nonsectarian.184 Rabbi Gutterman delivered an invocation and a
benediction, addressing “God” and thanking God for various blessings bestowed
upon America in general and the graduating students in particular, and asking God’s
guidance for the students in their future endeavors. 185 At no time in his prayer did
Rabbi Gutterman invoke any sectarian reference either to Yahweh, Jehovah, or
Adonai, to the Jewish faith or to the Lord or Jesus Christ of the Christian faith. 186
Deborah Weisman was one of the students graduating from Nathan Bishop. Four
days before the graduation ceremony, her father, Daniel Weisman brought suit in
United States District Court as a Providence taxpayer and as next friend of Deborah,
seeking to enjoin the reading of the prayers at the ceremony. 187 The district court
denied a temporary restraining order, and the graduation ceremony went forward as
planned, with Deborah in attendance. 188 Following the ceremony, Daniel Weisman
filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction barring officials from
Providence public schools from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and
benedictions at future graduations.189 On stipulated facts, the district court, applying
Lemon, granted a permanent injunction, ruling that Providence’s practice of
including invocations and benedictions in public school graduations violated the
Establishment Clause, and specifically, that such prayers, even if nonsectarian,
created “an identification of governmental power with religious practice,” thereby

181

Id. at 581.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Id. at 581-82.

186

Id.

187

Id. at 584.

188

Id.

189

Id.
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effectively endorsing religion.190 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,191 and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.192
The Court began its analysis with the proclamation that “it is beyond dispute that,
at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” 193 However, the
Court expanded the concept of coercion to include “subtle coercive pressure,” most
pronounced in the confines of public education, wherein such coercion occurs simply
because the student partaking in such graduation exercise, itself not mandatory, lacks
any “real alternative which would have allowed [him or] her to avoid the fact or
appearance of participation.”194 The Court also found that while the clergy recited a
prayer of his or her own choosing, the principal of the school in fact directed and
controlled the content of the prayers through the issuance of the guidelines pamphlet
and through the instruction that the prayers remain “non-sectarian.”195
The Court then clarified what it believed the impetus behind the Establishment
Clause to be:
The explanation [the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on forms of state
intervention in religious affairs] lies in the lesson of history that was and
is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands
of government what might begin as tolerant expression of religious views
may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A state-created orthodoxy
puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.196

190

Id. at 585.

191

Id.

192

Lee v. Weisman, 499 U.S. 918, 918 (1991).

193

Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).

194

Id. at 588. This conclusion might acquire greater validity in the context of activity
occurring within the overall student-school relationship, where a dissenting student may
reasonably fear some form of academic reprisal for voicing dissent. However, in the context
of a graduation ceremony, where the student-school relationship has already ceased, such fear
becomes less compelling.
195

Although the Court acknowledged that the clergy had no obligation to follow these
guidelines or instructions, it nevertheless found, without any apparent factual support in the
record, that “no religious representative who valued his or her continued reputation and
effectiveness in the community would incur the state’s displeasure” by ignoring the principal’s
instructions. Id. It could be equally assumed that no clergy would compromise religious or
ecclesiastical sanctity for concerns over political expediency. In any event, not only did the
Court conclude that the students were coerced to participate, but that the rabbi was equally
coerced to follow state-sponsored religious doctrine. See id.
196

Id. at 591-92. The majority appears more concerned with the quality of faith that might
be compromised by any type of state coercion, as opposed to the imposition of creed and
orthodoxy through the machinations of government, where the Church, as an institution,
possesses political power, such as the Roman papacy that emerged under Constantine.
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The Court proceeded to examine the subtle coercion that it found to exist within the
graduation ceremony itself:
The undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of
a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain
respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure,
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion [to
participate] . . . . It is of little comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that
for her the act of standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect,
rather than participation. What matters is that, given our social
conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the
group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it. 197
The majority placed great emphasis on the circumstances of the case, from the
standpoint that the target audience, school-age children, “are often more susceptible
to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in
matters of social convention.”198 The Court thus found the implied “choice” of
students whether to participate or not an illusory one, and reasoned that “the
government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use
more direct means.”199 As such, the injury experienced by the students would be one
occasioned by their required participation, under the aegis of the State, in a religious
exercise. The Court rejected the notion that inclusion of the prayer, however brief,
constituted but a de minimus intrusion, opining that to hold such prayer as de
minimus would be an “affront” to the rabbi who offered them and to the students
who held them sacred.200
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and
O’Connor, reiterated Jefferson’s oft-cited “wall of separation,” and the reasoning in
Everson.201 The concurrence also cited existing Court precedent202 as support for the
proposition that any religious reference in the public school setting, even if
denominationally neutral and voluntary, nonetheless violated the Establishment
Clause as de facto state sponsorship of religious activities. The concurrence then

197

Id. at 593.

198

Id. at 593-94 (citations omitted).

199

Id. at 594.

200

Id. This conclusion of course now places the analysis equally on the audience and on
the purveyor of the religious message, but again begs the question as to whether any religious
message, if it be religious at all, could even conceivably be devoid of profound meaning upon
its adherents. It is in fact doubtful whether any religious expression could have any meaning
at all absent such a defining characteristic; in fact, any contrary conclusion would invite the
absurd possibility of the promotion of a religious message nonetheless devoid of religious
content, thereby ceasing to be religious at all.
201

Id. at 600-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

202

See Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (prayer selected by state authority to be read aloud by
students); Abington, 374 U.S. at 206-07 (Bible reading or recitation of the Lord’s prayer over
school address system); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98 (law preventing the teaching of evolution).
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concluded that the majority’s finding of coercion, subtle or not, although not
necessary to show an Establishment Clause violation, would suffice to show
endorsement: “[g]overnment pressure to participate in religious activity is an obvious
indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion.” 203
Justice Souter’s separate concurrence addressed two interrelated issues: (1)
whether the Establishment Clause proscribes state practices that show no preference
to any religion or denomination, and (2) whether state coercion, above and beyond
any state endorsement of religious exercise or belief, is a necessary element of an
Establishment Clause violation.204 In answering the first question in the affirmative,
Souter concluded that the Establishment Clause forbids any state sponsored prayers,
whether theistic or sectarian.205 Souter termed this “settled law.”206
Souter next turned to the element of coercion. While acknowledging the “force”
of the coercion arguments, Souter nevertheless declined to adopt a coercion analysis,
an adoption he felt the Court could not undertake “without abandoning our settled
law.”207 As Souter reasoned:
Like the provisions about ‘due’ process and ‘unreasonable’ searches and
seizures, the constitutional language forbidding laws ‘respecting an
establishment of religion’ is not pellucid. But virtually everyone
acknowledges that the Clause bans more than formal establishments of
religion in the traditional sense, that is, massive state support for religion
through, among other means, comprehensive schemes of taxation . . . .
This much follows from the Framers’ explicit rejection of simpler
provisions prohibiting either the establishment of a religion or laws
‘establishing religion’ in favor of the broader ban on laws ‘respecting an
establishment of religion.’208
Justice Scalia authored a scathing dissent. Scalia posited a “history and traditions”
approach to the Establishment Clause, citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Allegheny. Scalia accused the majority of implementing a “bulldozer of its social
engineering” through its invention of a “boundless, and boundlessly manipulable,
test of psychological coercion,” through which it “lays waste a tradition that is as old
as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an
even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public
203

Weisman, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

204

Id. at 609.

205

Id. at 610.

206

Souter’s “settled law” speaks only in generalities, of imprecise and at times divergent
concepts of “religious purpose,” religious message, of “preferential support,” of “symbolic
union of church and state.” Id. at 612-19.
207
Id. at 618. Souter does not identify any precise rule gleaned from the “settled law,”
other than oblique references to vague, subjective prohibitions against government
sponsorship or approval of certain religions over others or of religion over nonreligion. See id.
at 610-31. Strangely, the only settled test adopted by the Court to date—Lemon—Souter
neglected to apply. See id.
208

Id. at 620.
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celebrations generally.”209 To Scalia, interpretation of the Establishment Clause
should “‘comport with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding
of its guarantees,’” where such evidence “‘sheds light not only on what the
draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought
that Clause applied’ to contemporaneous practices.” 210 After discussing the history
of the nation with respect to the inclusion of prayer in governmental ceremonies and
proclamations, Scalia labeled the majority’s approach as “psychology practiced by
amateurs,” and its conclusion that state officials coerced students to participate in the
graduation invocation and benediction as “incoherent.” 211
4. Lemon’s Interment—Kiryas Joel
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet 212 presented
a highly unusual, and altogether unique, factual setting. The Village of Kiryas Joel,
in Orange County, New York, consisted entirely of members and practitioners of
Satmar Hasidim, a sect of Judaism and strict adherents to the Torah, a practice that
required its members, among other things, to segregate the sexes outside the home,
to speak Yiddish as its primary language, to dress in distinctive garb, and to eschew
most aspects of modern society, such as television, radio, and English-language print
publications. Following World War II, surviving members of the sect moved from
Europe and relocated to the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.
Thereafter, in 1974, the Satmars purchased an approved but undeveloped subdivision
in the town of Monroe, and assembled a community that eventually became the
Village of Kiryas Joel.213
Because of their separationist lifestyle, the Satmars formed their private religious
schools outside the auspices of the Monroe-Woodbury school district, namely, the
United Talmudic Academy for males and the Bais Rochel for females. These
schools, however, offered no special services for handicapped children, who,
statewide, were entitled to special education services regardless of whether they were
otherwise enrolled in private schools. Although the Monroe-Woodbury school
district provided such special education for the schoolchildren of Kiryas Joel at an
annex at the Bais Rochel location, the district discontinued this practice in 1985. 214
As a result, the Kiryas Joel children who needed special education were forced to
209

Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

210

Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 and Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790).

211

Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

212

Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).

213

Id. at 690-91.

214

Id. at 691-92. Specifically, the district discontinued this practice in response to two
Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and
Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Aguilar held unconstitutional New
York City’s practice of paying the salaries of public school teachers who provided remedial
services in parochial school settings. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404, 414. Ball invalidated Grand
Rapid’s practice of utilizing nonpublic school facilities, at public expense, to provide
instruction by teachers who were paid wholly or partly out of public funds. Ball,473 U.S. at
375, 398.
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receive such services at the Monroe-Woodbury public schools. However, most of
these children, already burdened by various physical, mental, or emotional disorders,
suffered severe trauma through their exposure to the outside environment. 215
Eventually, the school district sought a declaratory judgment in state court as to
whether state law barred it from providing special education services outside the
district’s regular public schools. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that
state law permitted Monroe to establish a separate public school within the Village,
but that Free Exercise considerations did not require such separate school. In
response, the New York State Assembly enacted enabling legislation that established
the Village of Kiryas Joel as a separate school district, with “all the powers and
duties of a union free school district.” 216 The statute also “empowered a locally
elected board of education to take such action as opening schools and closing them,
hiring teachers, prescribing textbooks, establishing disciplinary rules, and raising
property taxes to fund operations.” 217 The legislation thus addressed the “‘unique
problem’ associated with providing special education services to handicapped
children in the village.”218
Eventually, various groups challenged the Kiryas Joel school district under the
New York and Federal Constitutions as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
The state trial court found the enabling statute unconstitutional under all three prongs
of Lemon v. Kurtzman.219 A divided state appeals court affirmed, holding that the
statute at issue had the primary effect of advancing religion, in violation of Lemon’s
second prong. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the federal question,
holding that the statute “created a ‘symbolic union of church and State’ that was
‘likely to be perceived by the Satmarer Hasidim as an endorsement of their religious
choices, or by nonadherents as a disapproval’ of their own,” thereby vesting the
statute with the primary effect of advancing religious belief. 220
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in another highly fractured opinion, held the
statute at issue violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the majority,
authored by Justice Souter, concluded that the statute creating the Kiryas Joel School
District delegated the state’s discretionary authority over public schools “to a group
defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context
that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised
neutrally.”221 As such, the majority concluded that the statute at issue transgressed
the Establishment Clause, which “compels the State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’

215

Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692.

216

Id. at 693 (citing 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 748).

217

Id. (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 1709 (McKinney 1988)).

218

Id. (quoting then New York Governor Mario Cuomo).

219

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

220

Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 695 (citing 81 N.Y.2d 518, 529).

221

Id. at 696.
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toward religion,”222 favoring neither one religion over another, nor collectively
favoring religious adherents over nonadherents.
The Court characterized the law as “an unusual and special legislative Act,” and
acknowledged that the statute itself did not delegate power based on religious belief
or religious practice, nor did it delegate power to be used in accordance with
religious beliefs, but rather, delegated power to establish a school district to a village
that happened to be populated entirely by members of the Satmar Hasidic sect. 223
Because of this circumstance, the majority concluded that the statute “effectively
identifies these recipients of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal
adherence, even though it does not do so expressly.” 224 The Court then found this
circumstance to constitute forbidden “fusion of government and religious
functions.”225
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion discussed at length the competing
concepts of neutrality, accommodation, and equal protection that the case presented.
O’Connor’s recitation of the myriad of tests developed by the Court, not just for
Establishment Clause cases, but for Free Speech cases and Equal Protection cases,
bears note. She recognized that “setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases
may sometimes do more harm than good,” and “shoehorning new problems into a
test that does not reflect the special concerns raised” by any particular case “tends to
deform the language of the test.”226
Justice Scalia authored the dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined. Scalia began his dissent with his usual vigor:
[T]he Founding Fathers would be astonished to find that the
Establishment Clause—which they designed ‘to insure that no one
powerful sect or combination of sects could use political or governmental
power to punish dissenters,’—has been employed to prohibit
characteristically and admirably American accommodation of the
religious practices (or more precisely, cultural particularities) of a tiny
minority sect. I, however, am not surprised. Once this Court has
222

Id. at 696 (citing Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
792-93 (1973), and Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104).
223

Id. at 699.

224

Id.

225

Id. at 702. While the majority went to great lengths to characterize the formation of the
village of Kiryas Joel as a religious endeavor, its analysis overlooks one crucial point—the
state action at issue was designedly narrow to suit the needs of one small sect, and not to
“establish” a state religion. See id. at 691. In fact, the statute did quite the opposite—rather
than establish a state religion, it allowed one established religion to govern itself. See id. Any
“delegation” of political authority to the sect was a delegation to be used by that sect and
applicable only to that sect, thus taking the analysis completely out of the establishment realm.
See id. at 691-92. The law at issue was not of general applicability, nor did it authorize
members of one religion to exercise any type of authority over nonmembers nor encumber
nonadherents; it did not make them political outsiders, nor did it occasion any coercion,
psychological or otherwise, upon any dissenting group, Christian, atheist, or Jew alike. See id.
226

Id. at 718-19.
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abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling
religious toleration the establishment of religion. 227
Scalia accused the majority of “steamrolling” and “collapsing” the special
circumstances present in the case, and characterized the majority’s holding as
“breathtaking.”228 To Scalia, the majority’s position amounted to the “novel
proposition” that political power, appropriately vested in any group of citizens, could
somehow become divested under the Establishment Clause where such group of
citizens, by design or happenstance, shared the same, or even similar, religious
beliefs.229 Scalia likened this approach to a wholesale disfavoring of religion as
religion, through the divestment of political power in a group purely on account of
religious beliefs, “positively antagonistic to the purposes of the Religion Clauses.”230
Scalia predicted that the majority would have “lauded” the legislation had it
delegated the power to create a special school district on account of cultural
differences occasioned by the parents of the schoolchildren being “nonreligious
commune dwellers, or American Indians, or gypsies”; Scalia refused to see any
contrary result mandated by cultural differences occasioned by religious belief. 231 In
this respect, Scalia concluded that the law was facially neutral, and not religiously
motivated.
D. The Wall Razed?
1. The Merging of the Disparate—Rosenberger and Neutrality
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia232 the Court
once again abandoned coercion and apparently merged all Establishment Clause
analyses with the concept of neutrality. Rosenberger involved a University of
Virginia policy that permitted the payment of printing costs of various student
publications. Specifically, as part of its program to support extracurricular student
activities on campus, the University allowed student groups to organize as
“Contracted Independent Organizations,” (“CIOs”). All CIOs enjoyed access to

227

Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

228

Id. at 735, 737.

229

Id. at 736. Scalia concluded that the majority’s approach would likely render the states
of Utah and New Mexico unconstitutional at the time of their admission into the union, as
residents of these states were predominantly Mormon and Roman Catholic, respectively. Id.
230
Id. Scalia did not accuse the majority of disfavoring the Satmar religion; however, he
did accuse the majority of failing to recognize that invalidation of vested political power—
solely because such political power becomes vested in people sharing the same religious
belief, and not on account of the belief but on account of the lifestyle accompanying such
belief—is tantamount to disallowing political power in any group of citizens who happen to
share common religious beliefs: “I see no reason why it is any less pernicious to deprive a
group rather than an individual of its rights simply because of its religious beliefs.” Id. at 737.
231

Id. at 741.

232

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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University facilities, including meeting rooms and computer terminals, but remained
otherwise unaffiliated with the University.233
While all CIOs attained recognition by the University, selected CIOs were also
eligible to apply for financial support from the Student Activities Fund (“SAF”).
The SAF existed to support a broad range of extracurricular activities “related to the
educational purpose of the University,” and the University Guidelines required that it
operate “in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the University as
well as with state and federal law.” 234 The SAF received its funding via a mandatory
$14.00 fee assessed to each full-time student of the University.
University rules limited eligibility for SAF funds to eleven categories of student
groups, among them being “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups.”235 University guidelines also excluded the
reimbursement of costs related to certain CIO activities that would otherwise be
eligible for SAF funds. Thus, an otherwise eligible CIO could not seek
reimbursement for the costs of engaging in “religious activities, philanthropic
contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the
University’s tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar
fees, or social entertainment or related expenses.”236 Whereas a “political activity”
comprised only those activities involving “electioneering and lobbying,” a “religious
activity” was not so limited, but rather comprised “any activity that ‘primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality.’”237
Petitioners’ organization, Wide Awake Productions (“WAP”), published a
newspaper, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia.238
The impetus of this newspaper, and in fact the underlying reason for WAP’s
existence, was to publish and disseminate a magazine that expressed philosophical
and religious viewpoints from a Christian perspective, to foster an atmosphere of
“sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints” and to “provide a unifying
focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.” 239 From the inaugural issue,
WAP’s newspaper expressed manifestly Christian viewpoints, among them being its
mission to “offer[] a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues,
especially those relevant to college students at the University of Virginia,” and “to
challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim
and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ
means.”240 The inaugural issue also included articles about racism, crisis pregnancy,
stress, prayer, C.S. Lewis’ ideas about evil and free will, and reviews of religious
233

Id. at 823.

234

Id. at 824 (citations omitted).

235

Id. (citations omitted).

236

Id. at 825.

237

Id. (citation omitted).

238

Id. at 825-26.

239

Id. at 826 (citation omitted).

240

Id. (citations omitted).
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music. Subsequent issues featured articles about homosexuality, missionary work,
and eating disorders, as well as more music reviews and interviews with professors.
An accompanying cross marked the end of each article. 241
An otherwise eligible CIO,242 WAP applied for SAF funds with respect to the
costs associated with printing its newspaper. The Appropriations Committee of the
Student Council denied the request on the grounds that Wide Awake constituted a
“religious activity” as defined under the Guidelines. WAP appealed the decision to
the full student Counsel, contending that it met all applicable Guidelines for SAF
support and that denial of such support violated the Constitution. The Student
Council denied the appeal without comment, and WAP appealed to the Student
Activities Committee. In a letter signed by the Dean of Students, the Committee
upheld the denial of funding. 243
Following the ruling of the Committee—the highest level of appeal within the
University structure—WAP, among other parties, filed suit in United States District
Court, alleging that the denial of SAF funding, based entirely on the viewpoint
expressed in its newspaper, violated WAP’s rights to freedom of speech and the
press, to the free exercise of religion, and to equal protection of the law. 244 The
district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the University, ruling
that denial of SAF support did not constitute impermissible content or viewpoint
discrimination against WAP’s speech, and that the University’s concomitant
Establishment Clause concern over SAF funding for WAP’s “religious activities”
justified the denial of payment for printing costs to third-party contractors.245 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and concluded that the Guidelines
did discriminate on the basis of content, but nevertheless upheld the district court,
finding that the refusal to permit SAF funding served a “compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and state,” and therefore necessary to avoid
an Establishment Clause violation.246 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both
issues.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. After concluding that the
Guideline barring SAF funding for “religious activities” amounted to viewpoint
discrimination, both on its face and as applied,247 the Court turned to the question of
241

Id.

242

Despite its asserted Christian perspective, WAP attained CIO status soon after its
formation. Id. The University did not contend that WAP qualified as a “religious
organization” under University Guidelines. Id.
243

Id. at 827.

244

The parties brought their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Petitioners also
brought several claims under Virginia law, but did not pursue those claims on appeal. Id. at
827.
245

Id. at 827-28.

246

Id. at 828.

247

Id. at 831-37. While the Court acknowledged that in a general sense, religious material
as such would comprise a distinct body of thought or subject matter, to which the prohibition
of content discrimination (barring all religious discussion) would apply, the Court concluded
that to bar religious discussion, or discussion from a religious perspective, of subjects that
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whether allowing SAF-funded reimbursement to WAP printing contractors would
violate the Establishment Clause. 248 At the outset, the Court treated the case as a
typical “government benefits to religion” case, where the establishment scrutiny
would focus on whether the criteria determining the receipt of such benefits, and the
receipt of the benefits themselves, flowed from neutral policies and fell upon groups
whose ideologies and viewpoints remained broad and diverse, even though some
benefits might aid religious groups.
The Court found the University’s SAF funding program to be neutral, in that it
provided funding for any CIO constituting a “student news, information, opinion,
entertainment, or academic communications media group[],” of which WAP
belonged,249 notwithstanding proscription on funding expenses incurred in “religious
activities.” The Court concluded that WAP sought SAF funding as a student news
and opinion journal rather than on account of its Christian viewpoint. News and
opinion from a Christian standpoint is still news and opinion, of which the
Guidelines permitted funding. Likewise, the student fees imposed to support the
SAF went to fund expenditures, in furtherance of the goal of disseminating a wide
variety of ideas, insofar as “student expression is an integral part of the University’s
educational mission.”250 SAF funds were not used to support religion, but rather to
support the dissemination of news and opinion from a Christian perspective, much as
the SAF would be available to any other CIO that disseminated news and opinion
from any other perspective.
Justice Thomas’ concurrence chastised the dissent for its mischaracterization of
the original meaning of Establishment Clause and its “misleading application of
history [that] yields a principle . . . inconsistent with our Nation’s long tradition of
allowing religious adherents to participate on equal terms in neutral government
programs.”251 Thomas interpreted James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance

themselves encompass general topics—such as reproduction, abortion, homosexuality, or
death (subjects capable of discussion from a perhaps infinite number of philosophical or
religious standpoints, be they Christian, Muslim, Hegelian, Kierkegaardian, Marxist, etc.)—
constitutes viewpoint discrimination, and therefore “an egregious form of content
discrimination.” Id. at 829.
248

The University actually abandoned this argument before the Supreme Court;
nonetheless, the Court ruled upon the issue inasmuch as the court of appeals had based its
decision on Establishment Clause grounds. Id. at 837.
249

Id. at 840.

250

Id. The Court noted that the fee imposed was not designed to support the government,
but to support academic and education-related activities of students. Id. In this respect, the
Court refused to conclude that the student fee was a “tax” exacted by the government for the
support of religion, or was a direct money payment to an institution engaged in religious
activities to support those activities. Id. at 840-41. Nor did the Court rule that the fee
qualified as public money. Id. at 841. In this vein, the Court also declined to address the issue
of whether a dissenting student who opposes particular speech funded by the $14.00 fee would
have a First Amendment right to seek a pro-rata return of that portion of his or her exacted fee
expended for the speech to which he or she objects. Id.
251

Id. at 852-53.
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Against Religious Assessments252 not as evidence that government must not prefer
religion over irreligion (thus barring all forms of monetary assessments that might
happen to benefit religious entities), but rather, as Madison’s view that government
may not bestow favor upon certain religious sects to the exclusion of others, wherein
“intolerance, bigotry, unenlightenment and persecution” generally result. 253 For
Thomas, the Establishment Clause simply did not proscribe state programs directly
aiding religious activity when such aid is a part of a neutral program available to a
wide variety of participants,254 true whether such benefit came in the form of
governmentally-funded facilities or in the form of government funds themselves. 255
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, placed particular scrutiny upon the overall
nature of WAP’s newspaper, which he characterized as both a newspaper
disseminating informative articles and opinion from a Christian perspective, and also
a device of proselytization, a publication that at its core spread a message of
Christian orthodoxy, exhorting sinners to repentance and to the salvation made
available through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 256 Based upon this
conclusion, Souter categorically rejected the notion of any state-sponsored or statefunded subsidization of such a publication as absolutely forbidden under the
Establishment Clause. The dissent, like Thomas, cited Madison’s Remonstrance, but
reached a different conclusion therefrom: that the Establishment Clause, as indicated
by history, disallowed all forms of governmental support for religion.257 With this
conclusion, the dissent stated that “evenhandedness” in the doling out of government
benefits could not of itself suffice to permit the direct financial support for religious
proselytization, even where such benefits are made available on a neutral basis and
subject to neutral criteria.258
252

For an informative discussion, see generally Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion and
works cited therein. Id. at 852-63.
253

Id. at 856.

254

Id. at 857-58. Here, Thomas falls prey to imprecision, much like the dissent, by
substituting “religious” for “religion” and in equating “religious activity” with religion. Id.
While direct government aid to religious activity that has sectarian overtones might implicate
the Establishment Clause where such aid is pervasive and funded by government mandate,
“religious activity” that might receive some governmental benefit cannot, as a matter of law,
constitute an Establishment of religion because it is not religion and is not establishment. See
infra Part IV.B.
255
Such aid might come in the form of various tax exemptions or credits for religious
institutions, being tantamount to a tax-funded government subsidy. Id. at 859-61.
256

Id. at 865-66. In reaching this conclusion, the dissent gave particular significance to the
doctrinal statements contained throughout the newspaper, even to its masthead, which bore
Paul’s exhortation in his Epistle to the Romans for believers to awake from their slumber
“because our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed.” Id. at 865.
257

Id. at 869 n.1.

258

Id. at 881-83. The “central analysis” became not the neutrality of the evenhandedness
of the funding itself, but rather upon whether the funding, if general, went to secular functions
that could be separated from the overall sectarian nature of the institution such as “sufficiently
to ensure that aid would flow to the secular alone.” Id. at 884.
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2. The Incoherent and Inchoate Mass of Approaches—Santa Fe
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,259 the Court examined the
practice of the Santa Fe Independent School District that permitted Santa Fe High
School to deliver a prayer over the public address system before every varsity
football game, a prayer recited by an elected student council chaplain. Two sets of
students—one Catholic and one Mormon—challenged this practice in district court.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the District amended its prayer policy to
allow that such prayer would be voluntary from the standpoint that (1) the student
council, under the advice and direction of the high school principal, would conduct
an initial election process whereby the entire student body would vote by secret
ballot as to whether a pre-game invocation260 would occur before all varsity football
games, and (2) if the student body voted that such an invocation would occur, the
student body would then elect a student from a list of student volunteers who would
deliver such invocation.261 The content of the invocation itself was left to the
discretion of the student delivering the invocation, “consistent with the goals and
purposes” of the amended policy.262
The district court eventually enjoined application of the rewritten policy, finding
that the rewritten policy, on its face, effectively coerced student participation in a
religious event, i.e., a sectarian prayer over the public address system at varsity
football games.263 Both the School District and the Doe parties appealed this
decision, the School District arguing that the enjoined portion of the rewritten policy
was permissible, and the Does contending that both the rewritten and the original
policies violated the Establishment Clause. A majority of the court of appeals agreed
with the Does, striking down both versions of the policy as applied to high school
sporting events.264 The Supreme Court granted the School District’s petition for
certiorari on the following question: “‘Whether petitioner’s policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment
Clause.’”265
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, upheld the ruling of the court
of appeals. Stevens citied Lee v. Weisman for the general proposition that
government may not coerce support or participation in religion, or the exercise
259

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

260

Id. at 294-98. The Court’s opinion indicates that the word “prayer” was removed from
the policy and replaced with references to “messages,” “statements,” and/or “invocations,”
although it is not clear from the opinion the context in which these words appeared. Id. at 298.
261

Id. at 298 n.6. The policy as amended contained a failsafe option of sorts, where, if a
court enjoined application of the re-written policy, the policy would revert to a previouslyexisting policy that provided essentially the same terms except that the content of any
invocation was to be “nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.” Id. at 297.
262

Id.

263

Id. at 299. Apparently, the policy at issue also applied to varsity baseball games as
well. Id.
264

Id. at 299-300.

265

Id. at 301.
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thereof, “or otherwise act in which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.’”266 Stevens then rejected the School District’s argument that the
invocations in question would constitute “private” speech by the students, and
therefore not attributable to the government under an Establishment Clause analysis,
but additionally protected under the Free Speech and Free Exercise provisions of the
First Amendment. In so rejecting, the Court refused to qualify the type of speech
involved as that occurring in Rosenberger, i.e., individual/private speech within a
governmentally-established limited public forum, but rather, as governmentallysponsored speech within a forum controlled by the school district, allowing access
thereto to only one student, who would perform the invocations under guidelines
established by the school system and specifically created for that very speech. 267
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of distorting existing
precedent and further demonstrating an overall “hostility to all things religious in
public life.”268 Rehnquist also expressed disagreement with what he perceived as the
majority’s cutting with too wide a swath in its facial invalidation, stating that
“[w]hile there is an exception to this principle [of the general refusal to render
wholly invalid a policy based on hypothetical or future contingencies] in the First
Amendment overbreadth context . . . no similar justification [exists] for
Establishment Clause cases.”269
3. A Beast with Two Heads—Van Orden and McCreary County
In 2005, the Supreme Court issued two simultaneous rulings, Van Orden v.
Perry270 and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky271
Collectively, these rulings represent the continuing division existing within the
Court, its most recent fracturing, and its most extreme display of the tensions
existing between the neutrality model and the history and traditions model of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.272 Van Orden involved an Establishment
Clause challenge brought by residents of the State of Texas seeking to enjoin the
266

Id. at 302.

267

Id. at 303-04. The Court acknowledged that these factors, standing alone, were not of
themselves determinative of whether the speech involved was private speech or government
speech; however, the Court concluded that, such factors taken together, and when coupled
with the fact that the speech at issue would be determined by majority vote, created a
mechanism of choosing speech—a mechanism set forth in the district’s policy—that by
definition silenced any dissenting or minority opinions, thereby creating not a limited public
forum but, rather, a forum where only preferred speech would occur—thereby making the
invocation government-sponsored speech. Id. at 304.
268

Id. at 318.

269

Id.

270

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).

271

McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).

272

Since these cases were decided, three members of the Court were replaced: Chief
Justice Rehnquist passed away and was replaced by current Chief Justice John Roberts; Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor retired and was replaced by Justice Samuel Alito; and Justice David
Souter retired and was replaced by Justice Sonia Sotomayor.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/4

44

2009]

A NEW ORIGINALISM

747

display of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. The
challenged display stood as a monolithic structure, six feet high and three and a half
feet wide. In 1961, the State accepted the monument as a donation by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles of Texas, a national social, civic, and patriotic organization. While
the State selected the location of the monument, the Eagles of Texas paid the cost of
erecting the structure, the dedication of which was presided over by two state
legislators.273 In 2001, Petitioner Thomas Van Orden, an erstwhile attorney, sued the
state under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking both declarative and injunctive relief, namely, a
declaration that the maintenance of the monument violated the Establishment Clause
and an injunction requiring its removal. Following a bench trial, the district court
held that the monument did not constitute an establishment of religion. Specifically,
the district court found (1) that Texas had a valid secular purpose in erecting the
statue (as recognition and commendation of the Eagles for their efforts in reducing
juvenile delinquency), and (2) that a reasonable observer, mindful of the history,
purpose, and context of the monument, would not conclude that the monument,
passive in nature and design, conveyed a message that the State was attempting to
endorse religion. The court of appeals affirmed with respect to both the purpose and
effect analysis. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 274
In affirming, the majority described its Establishment Clause jurisprudence as
“Januslike,” one face examining the history and traditions of the country, the other
affixing its gaze upon the dangers to religious freedom posed by that government
intervention in religious matters.275 To the majority, Establishment Clause analysis
necessitated consideration of both faces to the extent that “[o]ur institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being, yet . . . must not press religious observances upon their
citizens.”276 Achieving a reconciliation of the two “requires that we neither abdicate
our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a
hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our
religious heritage.”277

273

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82.

274

Id. at 682-83. While not evident from the Court’s opinion, the rationale applied by the
court of appeals amounted to some conjunctively disjunctive form of Lemon, where
endorsement and neutrality became sub-divisions of the purpose and effect prong of Lemon.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 177-78 (5th Cir. 2003).
275
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683. Again, threats to religious freedom find defense in the
Free Exercise Clause. As posited herein, the threats to free exercise must always be present
where establishment is called into question. The protections afforded by Free Exercise are
greater, not lesser, than the protection afforded by Establishment, to the extent that Free
Exercise protections are broader reaching and will afford protection even where no
establishment exists; however, as posited, there can be no establishment without an
accompanying, and in fact preceding or conjoining, free exercise infringement. Where no free
exercise threat exists, ipso facto, no establishment can exist.
276

Id.

277

Id. at 683-84. Rehnquist’s opinion rejected the Court’s primary assumption, stemming
from Everson, that the Establishment Clause forbids any governmental preference to religion
over irreligion, given the Court’s longstanding principles of acknowledgement, preferences, or
accommodations of religion. Id. at 687-88. Here, then, is where any government hostility
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While not rejecting Lemon, the majority declared it “not useful” with respect to
the “passive” monument erected on Capitol grounds. 278 Instead, the majority’s
analysis was driven by the overall nature of the monument itself as well as the
history and traditions of the nation. 279 The majority viewed the monument as an
acknowledgment of the role the Ten Commandments has played in the Nation’s
heritage; the majority found similar longstanding monuments not only to the Ten
Commandments, but to the acknowledgment of God and other religious themes in
general, interspersed throughout Washington, D.C. itself.280 Furthermore, the
majority reviewed the historical recognition the Decalogue played in all branches of
government, such displays and recognitions “bespeak[ing] the rich American
tradition of religious acknowledgments.”281
The majority then turned to the nature of the monument itself, recognizing that
the Ten Commandments, as a religious matter, imbibed the monument with religious
significance. However, the nature of the Ten Commandments, as contained within
the Mosaic law, also bore historical and social significance, apart from its status as
embodiment of religious principles; 282 to the majority, the mere imbuing of a symbol
with religious content, or its accompanying capability of conveying or promoting
some message consistent with religious doctrine, would not of itself strip it of any
overall non-religious meaning, and would not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.283 Notwithstanding this general principle, the majority also recognized limits
implicitly placed upon the government’s use or acknowledgment of religious
symbols, such as laws mandating their placement in a public school setting where
such law evinces a “plainly religious purpose.”284 Thus, given the setting in which a
religious symbol would be placed285—in elementary schools versus legislative
toward religion would require a Free Exercise examination of whether the hostility rose to the
level of a law prohibiting the free exercise.
278

Id. at 686.

279

Id.

280

Id. at 688-89.

281

Id. at 690.

282

Id. Similar monuments, be they statues, plaques, inscriptions on buildings, or some
other form, all might in some sense, at least with the Ten Commandments, or Decalogue,
acknowledge the religious item as a symbol for a more general idea or concept. “Conceptual
symbolism” it could be called, whereby we use either the Ten Commandments or an image of
the Greek Goddess Themis to represent a nonreligious ideal, be it justice, or mercy, or
judgment.
283

Id. at 690.

284

Id. The Court recognized its particular vigilance over Establishment Clause concerns
occurring within the confines of elementary and secondary schools. Id. at 691.
285
Conditioning the meaning behind the use of religious symbols, or other religious
acknowledgments, might prove expedient, but it is equally unsound; a symbol as such cannot
have meaning apart from that ascribed to it by society. If society chooses a symbol to stand
for a concept or principle, then that symbol must remain so regardless of its surroundings. The
Ten Commandments on the Courthouse walls mean the same as in school buildings.
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chambers—such symbol may in fact serve as a passive tool of proselytization. 286
The Court therefore concluded that displaying the Ten Commandments, having both
religious and nonreligious connotations, and given its placement, served as a passive
symbol, falling far short thereby of violating the Establishment Clause. 287
Scalia’s concurrence reiterated his often-stated position that the Court adopt a
consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence “in accord with our Nation’s past and
present practices,” the salient feature of which being “that there is nothing
unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God through
public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the
Ten Commandments.”288 Justice Thomas concurred in full but stressed his
jurisprudential theory of original meaning, in terms of establishment as necessarily
displaying “actual legal coercion” such as “mandatory observance or mandatory
payment of taxes to support ministers,” or some other method of compulsory
observance of religious doctrine.289 For Thomas, the Court’s Establishment clause
approach “elevates the trivial to the proverbial ‘federal case,’ by making benign
signs and postings subject to challenge,” and provides “no principled way” to
determine the existence of religious significance at all, or by which to measure the
line separating acknowledgment from establishment. 290
In this way, the
“incoherence of the Court’s decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause
impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.” 291
Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence noted at the outset that the clarity sought by
Thomas could not be achieved by application of a “precise” formula, and that resort
must be made to the overall purposes of the Religion Clauses, those being assurance
of the “fullest possible scope of religious liberty” and avoidance of “that divisiveness
based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government
and religion alike.”292 In furtherance of these ends, “government must ‘neither
286
It seems doubtful, for Establishment Clause purposes, that any proselytization can be
passive; likewise, no Establishment can be passive. It cannot arise by circumstance, but by
will. It is imposed, not occasioned.
287

Id. at 691-92.

288

Id. at 692.

289

Id. at 693-94. Justice Thomas also espoused a position that the Establishment Clause’s
text and history “‘resis[t] incorporation’ against the States” via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 693.
290

Id. at 694.

291

Id. at 694-95. The Court has never even attempted to formulate any “principled
approach” to the determination of “religion” as embodied by the Establishment Clause. While
Justice Thomas seeks a principled way to separate the religious from the nonreligious
significance with respect to “benign signs and postings,” or between the acknowledgment
versus the establishment of religion, he misses the mark entirely in terms of clear
constitutional text. What is required is a principled approach with which to determine and
differentiate “religion” (and a violation if established) with “religious,” which even if
“established” under current precedent, nonetheless presents no Establishment Clause problem.
See infra Part IV.
292

Id. at 698.
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engage in nor compel religious practices,’” nor must it “‘effect . . . favoritism among
sects or between religion and nonreligion,” nor must it “‘work deterrence of [any]
religious belief.’”293 While Breyer seemed to consider neutrality alone as an
“insufficient” touchstone, he also concluded that the Court’s other tests could not
“readily explain the Establishment Clause’s tolerance, for example, of the prayers
that open legislative meetings . . . ”;294 he nevertheless acknowledged that where “the
relation between government and religion is one of separation, but not of mutual
hostility and suspicion, one will inevitably [encounter] borderline cases.” 295
A companion case, McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky296 likewise involved
the posting of the Ten Commandments on government property, albeit in two
Kentucky County Courthouses, one located in McCreary County and one in Pulaski
County, Kentucky. Unlike Van Orden, however, and with almost a mirror opposite
of voting blocks, the Court concluded that the posting of the Ten Commandments
violated the Establishment Clause.
Each County displayed the Commandments in large gold-framed wall hangings:
McCreary County hung the display pursuant to an actual order by the County
legislature to do so, while Pulaski County ceremonially hung the display in the
presence of, and at the apparent behest of, the County Judge-Executive, accompanied
by his church pastor. Both Counties’ displays contained an abridged rendition of the
Ten Commandments as found in the King James version of the Holy Bible, including
a citation to Exodus 20:3-17, and were readily visible by any person conducting
business at the respective courthouses. 297 Eventually, the American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky, among others, challenged both displays in federal district court.
During the pendency of that lawsuit, both Counties passed resolutions authorizing
a second, more expansive display. Each County resolution declared the Ten
Commandments to be “‘the precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal
codes of . . . Kentucky are founded,’. . . that ‘the Ten Commandments are codified in
Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws,’” and various other statements evincing the
importance of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky’s past.298 The expanded
displays, along with the Ten Commandments, contained a second display of eight
other documents in smaller frames, each having some form of an historical or
government declaration recognizing God, prayer, or the Bible.299
293

Id. (citations omitted).

294

Id. at 698-99 (citations omitted). What the Court’s test may not explain, the clear text
of the Establishment Clause out of which these tests arose does: Legislative prayer is by no
means “religion” in a hard sense, nor is it “establishment” by force of law.
295
Id. at 700. While no “test” can abate all possibility of borderline cases (those cases
requiring fact-intensive analysis), a test that adheres to, rather than merely explicates or
enhances, the text of the Constitution as primary, without supplantation, displacement, and
substitution or addition, remains the only viable and consistent option in deciding these
borderline cases.
296

McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).

297

Id. at 851-52.

298

Id. at 853.

299

Id. at 853-54.
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Following the assembly of the expanded displays, the district court issued a
preliminary injunction against both displays, ordering their immediate removal. In
doing so, the district court applied Lemon’s three part test, finding that the displays
lacked any secular purpose. Both Counties filed notices of appeal from the
injunction, but dismissed the appeals after acquiring new legal counsel. Thereafter,
both Counties enacted new displays, entitled “The Foundations of American Law
and Government Display,” containing an expanded version of the Ten
Commandments, alongside other legal documents such as the Magna Carta, the Bill
of Rights, and the Kentucky Constitution, as well as a picture of Lady Justice. A
statement describing the historical and legal significance accompanied each
document.300 The ACLU moved to supplement the previous injunction to include the
third display, and the Counties responded with renewed arguments that the displays
had a valid educational purpose. The district court disagreed and broadened the
injunction to include the third displays. Both Counties appealed, and a divided panel
of the circuit court upheld the district court, holding that despite the inclusion of
other secular documents alongside the Ten Commandments, their “‘lack of a
demonstrated analytical or historical connection’” to the Ten Commandments,
evinced an impermissible religious purpose behind the display. 301 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
Justice Souter, writing for a five-member majority, relied primarily on the
Court’s per curiam decision in Stone v. Graham302 in holding that the counties’
display of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause. Stone
involved a Kentucky state law that required the posting of the Ten Commandments
in all public school classrooms. The Stone Court labeled the Ten Commandments an
“instrument of religion” and concluded that their presence in public school
classrooms, devoid of any accompanying secular theme, lacked a secular educational
purpose, thereby constituting an advance of religion. 303 Souter recognized that Stone
did not stand for a per se proscription of any governmental display of the
Commandments, necessitating a consideration of the overall context in which such a
display occurs. Souter found two overarching similarities between the displays at
issue and the display in Stone: (1) both displays set out the actual text of the
Decalogue, as opposed to some symbolic representation thereof, 304 and (2) each
300

Id. at 855-57.

301

Id. at 856-58. Only one judge of the majority also found that the display violated the
effects prong in that “a reasonable observer would find that the display had the effect of
endorsing religion given the lack of analytical connection between the Commandments and
the other documents in the display, the courthouse location of the display, and the history of
the displays.” Id. at 858 n.8.
302

Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).

303

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 867 (citing Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 n.3).

304

Id. at 868. Such symbolic representation might depict “10 roman numerals, which
could be seen as alluding to a general notion of law, not a sectarian conception of faith.” Id.
This suggestion transforms the Court into a national art critic; moreover, it suggests the
ridiculous, as the very force of the Ten Commandments as a symbol of law exists and arises
within and from the text of the Commandments themselves. Such an “alternative”
representation would be akin to suggesting that the government could denude or buffer the
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stood alone rather than as a component of a larger secular display. 305 In sum, any
display of the actual text of the Ten Commandments, standing alone or absent
“sequiturious” or “logically connected” secular “buffers” interspersed throughout,
became thereby “an unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious
obligations and with morality subject to religious sanction. When the government
[endeavors] to place this statement alone in public view, a religious object is
unmistakable.”306
The majority then turned to the post-suit but pre-judgment
alterations/modifications made to the displays at issue. Because the government
made these modifications during already pending legal proceedings, the Court
deemed them insincere attempts to vest the displays with newfound historical,
educational, and civic significance through the inclusion of countervailing secular
material. The Court determined these efforts disingenuous on their face, and
substantively insufficient under the Establishment Clause. 307
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, concluded otherwise. First, it argued
against the majority’s conclusion that the Establishment Clause required complete
government neutrality as to religion; second, it argued that the scope of the neutrality
had been extended beyond any of the decisions reached in prior cases; and third, it
argued that even where the principle of neutrality correctly considered as required
under the Establishment Clause, the decision that the displays at issue violated the
Establishment Clause was incorrect.308

Christian imagery inherent in Michelangelo’s Pieta only by substituting stick figures for Mary
and the Christ. Furthermore, this conclusion directly contradicts the “reasonable observer”
approach to the effects/endorsement analysis, as certainly any reasonable observer of an image
of stone tablets containing roman numerals I through X would understand that image to
represent the Ten Commandments, an impermissible “instrument of religion” under Stone.
305
Id. The Court’s conclusion is troubling given that both courthouse displays included
additional images; however, the Court reasoned that despite the presence of additional images,
the placing of the Ten Commandments as central negated any presumption that the inclusion
of secular images sufficed to integrate the Commandments into an overall secular display. Id.
It is difficult to imagine any scenario where the Ten Commandments would be so integrated
into other disjointed secular imagery that the religiously moral purpose for its inclusion would
be lost upon the viewer.
306

Id. at 869. If “morality subject to religious sanction” is one factor determinative of
“religion” within the meaning of the Establishment Clause, then the Court would do well to
include the concept of “sanction” as determinative of any “establishment” thereof.
Furthermore, it would be hard to imagine any display of the Ten Commandments having any
symbolic significance bereft of these essential elements; and so bereft, the symbol becomes
stripped of the very concept it represents, rendering it meaningless and neutered.
Also, the presence of an “unmistakable religious object” begs the question as to whether
such “religious” object constitutes religion. It does not. Furthermore, any statements made by
the object are statements not of the government, but those imbedded in history, statements that
have in fact occurred millennia ago.
307

Id. at 869-70.

308

Id. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. GRAMMAR AND USAGE/LINGUISTIC MODALITY—A HERMENEUTICAL LODESTAR
A. Problems Inherent in Supertextual Approaches
As discussed supra, the problems inherent in ignoring constitutional text manifest
themselves through the creation, and sustainment, of surrogate standards that through
continued use become surrogate “supertext” to the Constitution’s clear language and,
therefore, supplant it. When this results, the text itself becomes secondary, and in
fact meaningless. We have seen, as outlined above, the most extreme example of
this supplantation in modern constitutional jurisprudence through the Court’s
disjointed treatment of the Establishment Clause. The “wall of separation” has so
confounded the analysis because it has created the ultimate supertextual standard—
that of separation. The word “separation,” of course, occurs nowhere within the First
Amendment. Furthermore, and more importantly, the surrogate concept of
separation has forced the Court to craft and re-craft multiple, disjointed tests so as to
accomplish its surrogate mandate of separation. 309
O’Connor’s separate concurring opinion in Kiryas Joel310 perfectly illustrates the
problems inherent in super-constitutional “tests,” which tempt judicial proclivity to
abandon clear constitutional text and to craft surrogate tests as definitive law rather
than as a rule with which to construe that text. Two problems arise: first, no Justice,
or lower judge, would dream to declare that any given problem is being
“shoehorned” into the language of the Constitution; second, and equally important, is
that the language of tests often transcends the constitutional text and subordinates the
meaning of that text to judicially-created law that by its very nature “acquire[s] more
and more complicated definitions which stray ever further from their literal
meaning.”311 If such is the necessary and unfortunate result of any particular test,
then the complications and straying inherent in their creation render subordinate the
actual language of the Constitution from which they, presumably, derive.
Equally disturbing is the judicial rationale for justifying the need to develop
multiple tests on the same subject, driven by some false judicial conviction that
clauses such as the Establishment Clause “cannot easily be reduced to a single
test.”312 This conclusion is anathema to the very nature underlying any constitution,
or any statute—that the language of the law drives the meaning of the law, and is not
merely some ornamental and symbolic springboard from which to develop abstract
tests that are mere shadows of the law, and thereby supplant the law through
application. At some point, the test, however well-intentioned, transcends the law
such that the analysis begins and ends with the language of the test, not the law.
When this happens, the law itself becomes transformed, or in the case of the
Establishment Clause, supplanted by multiple and disparate tests; O’Connor’s
admonishment then rings true, that courts, “[r]ather than taking the opportunity to

309

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803-13 (1983).

310

Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).

311

Id. at 719 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

312

Id. at 720.
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derive narrower, more precise tests from the case law, . . . tend to continually try to
patch up the broad test, making it more and more amorphous and distorted.” 313
It strains credulity to accept as a notion of constitutional interpretation that
disparate tests can be derived from the same source, or that different tests can govern
a singularly stated proscription. There is, however, one rationale that may explain
such a proclivity: the usurpation of judicial power so as to accomplish an outcome
that satisfies the Court’s quest for a just result. Thus, where the text of the
Establishment Clause does not fit neatly into the desired result, it is ignored,
broadened, substituted, supplanted, so as to achieve such result; and because the
desired result—that of separation—is equally super-textual, the language of the law
can never lead to the desired outcome.
1. Lemon/Endorsement Model
In Lemon, the Court posited that the proscription against an establishment
included any “step towards” establishment, apparently construing the meaning of the
term “respecting” as “nearing” or “approaching,” thereby broadening by substitution
the prohibition against laws respecting establishment. 314 Moreover, the Court treated
the term “respecting” as modifying “establishment of religion” rather than “law,” the
result of which mandated a separation of government from religion as opposed to the
proscription of laws respecting establishment.315 In this analysis, the explicit
requirement of “law” dilutes to the point of inconsequentiality, and “religion”
expands into the realm of anything remotely “religious.”
The methodology cannot sustain itself nor can it remain cohesive. A law may
respect religion but not establish religion, and yet under Lemon, government conduct
respecting a religious topic would perforce constitute a law approaching an
establishment of religion and a violation. Under this methodology, establishment
becomes engulfed by all judicial notions of what “approaches” it. In other words,
because the Lemon test expands the ambit of the term “respecting,” it thereby
expands both the noun it modifies, “law,” and its object, “establishment of religion.”
Furthermore, Lemon’s three sub-classes of ways a law can “respect” religion—
purpose, effect, and entanglement—essentially eliminate the distinction between
“religious” and “religion.”316 So as can be applied to any given case, the government
may pass a law (or undertake a policy) with a clear religious effect, such as the
erection of a cross on government grounds. Because a cross is a religious symbol,
the policy would have the effect of appearing to advance the Christian religion, and
fall squarely within the prohibitions of Lemon. However, the act of erecting the
cross, whether by law or policy, is by no means a law respecting an establishment.
The detachment from text, however, allows for the analysis to stray into the “step
toward” establishment realm, and also allows “religious” symbols to achieve a type
of “conceptual symbolism” where the symbol becomes the concept, where the
religious becomes the religion. Therefore, because the act of erecting a cross on
313

Id.

314

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.

315

Id. at 612.

316

Id. at 612-13.
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public property undoubtedly involves the creation of the conceptual symbolism of
Christianity, the act itself becomes a “step towards” not only the erection of the
symbol, but the creation, or establishment if you will, of the concept. So, for the
purposes of Lemon, the construction of a cross on government property would
necessarily serve as a step toward Christianity, which would then become an act
respecting Christianity. While the erection of a cross does not establish Christianity,
it is a conceptual symbol of the religion, and consequently, tantamount to the religion
itself. So under Lemon, the cross would violate the Establishment Clause while
meeting neither of the operative words of the clause, i.e., it would be neither an
establishment nor a religion.
The advancement portion of Lemon’s “effects” prong has since become melded
with the notion of “endorsement.” 317 Whereas the concept of endorsement can occur
both actively and passively, the concept of advancement, in a strict semantic sense,
cannot classify as a passive activity. As the Court itself has acknowledged, the term
endorsement “is not self-defining,” hence the need to utilize even broader analysis
that perforce acquires even greater disconnection from constitutional text.318 This
disconnectedness displays most clearly when the Court, as in Allegheny, stated that
“[w]hether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential
principle remains the same.”319 From a textual standpoint, this conclusion is
ludicrous. The “key word” and “essential principle” in any constitutional analysis
must be words and principles chosen by the drafters and included therein; and for
Establishment Clause analysis, the key word must remain “establishment,” and the
essential principle, “establishment of religion.”
A law “fostering” an “excessive entanglement” with religion likewise constitutes
a law respecting an establishment of religion, even if it has a secular purpose and
neither advances or inhibits religion. Again, this test imposes super-constitutional
implicature serving as a surrogate for explicit text: “fostering” replaces “respecting,”
and “entanglement” replaces “establishment.” Equally disturbing is the Court’s
substitution of ambiguous terms without attempting to establish any set of criteria
with which to determine them; if the Court cannot fashion a definitive rule with
which to determine establishment, how much less can it fashion a test with which to
determine entanglement so excessive as to constitute an establishment? Lemon’s
continued existence, however, remains most troubling in that the Court has since
developed additional “tests” that exist along some unsound continuum with
Lemon.320
The obvious implication becomes, then, that the existence of
multitudinous tests creates multiple, and disparate, Establishment Clauses. No sound
system of legal thought can ever support such a result.

317

See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93.

318

Id. at 593.

319

Id.

320

See Kristen M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring
of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27 PAC L.J. 121, 126, 144-45 (1995); Lambs Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Kenneth M. Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court’s New Establishment Clause
Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1198-1203 (1984).
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In Marsh v. Chambers, for example, Justice Brennan’s dissenting analysis
reached beyond Lemon’s prongs and emphasized the principles of “separation” and
“neutrality” that he found “implicit” in the Establishment Clause. 321 Emerging from
these “implicit” principles were still deeper implicit principles, “relevant” and yet
that much further removed from actual text. The first of such principles (which the
dissent termed “purposes”) was what the dissent described as “to guarantee the
individual right to conscience,” implicated not only when “the government engages
in direct or indirect coercion” but also when “the government requires individuals to
support the practices of a faith with which they do not agree.” 322 A second such
principle was “to keep the state from interfering in the essential autonomy of
religious life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious issues or by
unduly involving itself in the supervision of religious institutions or officials.” 323 A
third such principle was “to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by
too close an attachment to the organs of government.” 324 A fourth such principle was
to “help assure that essentially religious issues, precisely because of their importance
and sensitivity, not become the occasion for battle in the political arena.” 325
The Marsh dissent then went a step further, however. Not only did it establish
these nascent principles, but it then imbued them with an even further reaching arch,
not only applying them “to the relationship of government to religious institutions or
denominations” as a whole, but extending them “to the relationship of government to
religious beliefs and practices,”326 all doing so with assurances that “this view of the
Establishment Clause is [not] a recent concoction of an overreaching judiciary.” 327
However, even Lemon does not mandate that the law at issue be devoid of
religious undertones or connotations, but rather, proscribes laws whose primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion. There is a tremendous difference, both
as a matter of normative meaning and usage, between “religious” and “religion.”
These are not synonymous terms, nor can they be used interchangeably within the
context of the Establishment Clause. 328 However, this difference has never been
321
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 803-13 (1983). Again, we see the process of substitution and the
subsequent elevation of “implicit” terms over “explicit” ones, where implicit ideas achieve
surrogate status as supertext of the Constitution.
322

Id. at 803. Of course, “coercion” has since become a second “test” by which the Court
has addressed Establishment Clause issues, discussed infra Part IV.A.2.
323
Id. at 803-04 (footnote omitted). Certainly, a state often takes upon itself the decision
to interfere with other “autonomies,” such as in the financial or economic realm (through
compulsory taxation and regulation) or in the realm of the family. Of course, such intrusion
does not necessarily implicate anything contained in the Constitution guaranteeing such
autonomy, except where the Court has engaged in the aforementioned addition of language,
and the rights created thereby, i.e., “privacy” or “substantive due process.”
324

Id. at 804.

325

Id. at 805.

326

Id. at 806.

327

Id.

328

Even the most cursory review of many Establishment Clause opinions reveals that the
Court itself often uses these two terms interchangeably.
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explicitly recognized or adequately addressed by the Court since the adoption of the
Lemon test. That is precisely because Lemon, being an ambiguous and disjointed
test, lends itself to such substitution of implicit terms for explicit ones, “religious”
for “religion.” A cross is religious; a menorah is religious; however, a cross is not
part and parcel with Christianity, nor is a Menorah part and parcel with Judaism. 329
Endorsement as a constitutional principle, established in Allegheny, instructs that
the government’s use of a religious symbol constitutes an unconstitutional step
toward establishment if it has the effect of endorsing religious belief; and that such
an effect is to be determined by the context in which such religious symbol appears.
The Allegheny Court deemed these principles “sound.” 330 Thus, the majority in
Allegheny, at first blush, appeared to discard, or at least distance itself from, the
Lemon standard, using not Lemon’s three pronged inquiry to evaluate state action but
rather setting forth an examination as to the effect of the state action at issue, i.e.,
“whether ‘the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’” 331 This new
endorsement approach, amazingly, both supplanted and supplemented Lemon from
the standpoint that “endorsement” becomes both a stand-alone proposition and a
surrogate for Lemon’s “effects” prong.332 Of course, since Lemon itself supplanted
explicit text, endorsement analysis remains twice removed from that text.
Furthermore, endorsement analysis, like Lemon, not only ignores the explicit
requirement of “law” within the Establishment Clause, it in fact eliminates it. Even
the concept of “ceremonial deism” 333 recognized as valid in such instances as “In
God We Trust” on currency, “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,”
or “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, misses the mark set by the text of the
First Amendment. References to God on government property—however generic—
carry with them no force of law. Presidential messages invoking the Almighty or
imploring prayer in times of crisis may offend agnostic or atheistic sensibilities, but
they in no way establish religion in the sense that they mandate adherence under
penalty of law to a particular creed or orthodoxy. Under endorsement, the focus
329

Indeed, even the Christian cross itself takes many forms, depending on the particular
branch of Christianity using it. The orthodox cross is markedly different than, say, the Latin
cross (the traditional cross used by Western Christianity), or even the Roman Catholic
crucifix, which, by definition, has affixed to it the corpus of Christ to denote his suffering.
330

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597, 668. The Court thus shifts a focus not to government
action—an “active” establishment—but to the general perception created by that action, where
the reasonable observer could in effect create a “passive” establishment because he or she
merely perceived an establishment. Or, in the case of judicially created and extraconstitutional tests that supplant text, the reasonable observer could declare an endorsement
(“passive endorsement”) where no such endorsement was undertaken (“active endorsement”).
See id. at 620. The dissent termed this shift in focus a “most unwelcome[] addition to our
tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 668.
331

Id. at 597 (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at 390). It should be noted here that the Court
eventually overturned Ball in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 203 (1997).
332

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97.

333

Id. at 603.
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shifts to the result of the government action, and not the action itself; therefore, a
crèche erected on city property might be deemed an endorsement even in the absence
of a “law” requiring such display.
Furthermore, the “jurisprudence of minutiae” that results from the subjective
context required by endorsement analysis “demands the Court to draw exquisite
distinctions from fine detail in a wide range of cases.”334 Moreover, the examination
as to whether the government’s use of a religious symbol in a holiday display, as in
Allegheny, is permissible given the lack of “reasonable alternatives that are less
religious in nature” inherently fails because “it requires not only that the Court
engage in the unfamiliar task of deciding whether a particular alternative symbol is
more or less religious, but also whether the alternative would ‘look out of place.’” 335
The very essence of the endorsement test, “with its emphasis on the feelings of the
objective observer, easily lends itself” to the type of inquiry” into the social
prominence enjoyed by any particular strand of religion receiving government
acknowledgment, which depending on the degree of prominence, would determine
whether such acknowledgment rises to the level of endorsement. 336 This type of
inquiry produces the unintended result that “[t]hose religions enjoying the largest
following must be [relegated] to the status of least-favored faiths so as to avoid any
possible risk of offending members of minority religions.” 337 The Court becomes, in
this respect, an arbiter not of law, but of social sensitivity.
2. Coercion Model
Coercion analysis also proves problematic. Allegheny’s dissent recognized the
coercive aspects inherent, and in fact necessary, for government action to constitute
“law,” but nevertheless distinguished between direct coercion—for example,
compelling observance of the Sabbath, imposing special taxes to support religious
institutions, or requiring public officials to declare allegiance to the Pope in order to
hold public office—and indirect, symbolic, or “passive” recognition of religion: the
former would amount to a per se violation of the Establishment Clause, while the
latter, save for extreme cases,338 would at most bestow some “intangible” benefit to
religion that is either “ensconced in the safety of national tradition” or “unlikely” to
pose a realistic risk of establishment. 339
Thus, the two guiding principles emerging from the Allegheny dissent appear to
be: (1) government may not directly coerce any participation or nonparticipation in
religion; and (2) government may not, through adoption or recognition of religious

334

Id. at 676 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment & dissenting in part).

335

Id. at 676-77 (internal citations omitted).

336

Id. at 677.

337

Id.

338

The Court cited as an example of such an extreme case a city that permitted the
permanent erection of a Latin cross on the roof of city hall, not as a per se violation but rather
one that would “place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on
behalf of a particular religion.” Id. at 607.
339

Id. at 661-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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symbols, concepts, or traditions, place its aegis upon selected religions or faiths, or
religion in general to the exclusion of nonreligion so as to amount to an indirect
coercion by proselytization.340 Indirect proselytization would occur in instances
where the government recognition or assistance confers an undue benefit on religion.
Such undue benefit does not occur in the context of legislative chaplains (Marsh),
public sponsorship of religious displays at Christmas (Lynch), provision of school
transportation to parochial schools (Everson), or tax exemptions for religious
organizations (Walz).341
The analysis undertaken in Lee v. Weisman examined activity occasioned at the
invitation of public officials and, as it occurred within the context of public school
graduation, cloaked with an “obligatory” or mandatory component. 342 The Court
made clear that the practice of including clergy-lead prayers at these graduations did
not implicate, or require, Free Exercise accommodation analysis under Lemon, and
stated that: “[t]he principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause.”343 The Court found the state action at issue constituted
“pervasive,” and impermissible, government involvement in religious activity, 344 “to
the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a
public school,” which circumstance the Court deemed determinative of the issue
before it, without resort to Lemon, or endorsement.345
The Weisman Court, while reciting coercion, also made the error of equating
religious with religion, and nonsectarian prayer with Establishment. Just as matters
of conscience, morality, and faith—perhaps inextricably tied to religion in a general
sense—do not by their relation thereto transform or overtake their object,
supplications for divine guidance do not become proclamations of the divine, and
what the divine is, to whom the divine reveals, or for whom the divine intercedes.
340

Id. at 659-63.

341

Id. at 662-63.

342

Weisman, 505 U.S. at 586. The majority reached this conclusion notwithstanding its
acknowledgement that the school district did not require attendance at graduation as a
condition for receipt of a diploma. See id.
343
Id. at 587. As discussed infra, Free Exercise accommodation, without more, could
never supercede Establishment Clause limitations.
344
Again, the Court examines “religious activity,” as opposed to religion, thereby skirting
explicit constitutional text and cloaking such text with superceding extra-constitutional
doctrine. See id. at 586. The Court also equated the State methods for including such
prayer—the choice by the principal—to a State statute mandating that such prayers take place.
See id. at 587. The expansion of constitutional text in this respect cannot be reconciled with
the traditional concept of “law” as compulsory state action.
345
Id. at 587. Here Justice Kennedy attempts to delve into the consciousness or the mental
state of the hypothetical attendee, thereby making the subjective perception of a single
observer determinative of an Establishment of Religion; what makes this mode of analysis
most disturbing is the fact that Kennedy himself rejected such subjective touchstone in his
Allegheny dissent. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s subjective approach in Weisman betrays
what he identified in Allegheny as the “imperative of applying neutral principles in
constitutional adjudication.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 676.
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While Weisman recognized the inherent tension between the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause, it mistook the display or exercise of the trappings of
religion for religion itself. 346 The Madisonian system and its dichotomy of majoritybased laws and constitutionally-protected rights invite a tyranny of the majority
through legislative fiat and a tyranny of the minority through judicial largesse.
Madison himself, cited by the majority, was concerned not so much with the
trappings of religion, or the religious, as with the “ecclesiastical establishments” that
ultimately defile, and not preserve, “the purity and efficacy of Religion.” 347
Nevertheless, the Weisman Court apparently declined to differentiate things
“religious” from the overall concept of “religion.” 348
The Court also distinguished its decision in Marsh given the “[i]nherent
differences between the public school system and a session of a state legislature,”
where the latter involves adults who are “free to enter and leave with little comment
and for any number of reasons,” who are, unlike the former, not confronted with the
choice to remain and comply or to boycott and thereby bypass “the one school event
most important for the student to attend,” a ceremony where family and friends come
together “to celebrate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all
to the end of impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and
duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts.” 349

346
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592 (“What to most believers may seem nothing more than a
reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context
may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the
State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.”). The “inherent tension” between Free Exercise and
Establishment exists as a result of Court-created tests, not from the language of the First
Amendment.
347
Id. at 590 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (W. Rachal, R. Rutland, B. Ripel, &
F. Teute eds. 1973)).
348

The Court drew a distinction between sectarian notions of religion and what it termed a
“civic” religion, or in other words, expressions of faith that do not rise to the level of
sectarianism or creeds, be they invocations of a generic or unidentified divinity, or higher
power, or otherwise non-offensive universal notions of “God.” Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589.
The Court nevertheless struck down civic religion as violative of the Establishment Clause,
where the mere absence of a specific creed could not neutralize the idea of God from its
religious origins. See id. Of course, such distinction begs the question of whether any
expression of religious content, be it prayer, or acknowledgement of a religious holiday, is (1)
a law; (2) a law respecting establishment; or (3) a law respecting an establishment of religion,
civic or otherwise. In this respect, the notion of a generic reference to a religious holiday such
as Christmas, with both religious and non-religious criteria, as permissible (as found in
Allegheny) cannot be reconciled with the generic notions of God in a commencement
ceremony, both of which involve non-establishment.
349

Id. at 595-97. The majority’s reasoning here might be more germane to the traditional
negligence approach to the law, where age and maturity often determine the duty and requisite
standard of care governed thereby; however, as matter of constitutional adjudication, where
the Establishment stands as an absolute, and not a relative, prohibition, such an approach
creates tiers or levels of scrutiny that again are themselves both foreign to and antagonistic
towards the clear text.
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Justice Souter’s logic in his concurrence in Weisman yields an interesting result
in terms of his analysis between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause, where he states that if coercion should be the test for Establishment Clause
cases, such a standard would effectively eviscerate the Free Exercise Clause, in that
“laws that coerce nonadherents to ‘support or participate in any religion or its
exercise’ . . . would virtually by definition violate their right to religious free
exercise.”350 Thus, Souter concludes that coercion, as an implied element of the Free
Exercise Clause, need not be a predicate upon which an Establishment Clause
violation would be based. Justice Souter rejected the notion that requiring absolute
governmental neutrality in matters of religion was irreconcilable with the
accommodation required by the Free Exercise Clause.
While government
accommodation “must lift a discernable burden on the free exercise of religion,” 351
any act of government that purported to accommodate religion by acting in an area
not otherwise burdened would amount to endorsement and thus a violation.
Justice Souter’s analysis is incorrect.
All establishments, if they be
establishments, must infringe upon free exercise; there can be no establishment
violation without an accompanying free exercise violation. Requiring coercion for
an establishment analysis in no way eviscerates the protections afforded by free
exercise; it clarifies them. As discussed infra, the placement of the participial
phrases indicate the first as the most extreme, and the second as less extreme, such
that government could infringe on free exercise without an accompanying
establishment, but never the reverse. Using coercion as a touchstone does not
delimit Free Exercise analysis, which must afford more expansive protections such
that the reach of its protections extends beyond establishment concerns. Coercion
then serves more as a model by which to determine whether a law respecting an
establishment exists, and not merely whether an establishment is threatened.
3. Neutrality/History and Traditions Model
Neutrality as a decisional test for Establishment Clause violations does not take
into account the inherent characteristic that neutrality, with respect to religion,
requires government passivity, while the only situations subject to Establishment
Clause scrutiny necessarily involve government action.
Neutrality as an
Establishment Clause determinative not only proves too much, but is most often a
self-executing analysis. Any law is government action; any law passed has some
function; any practice involving anything remotely “religious” must perforce be
motivated in some way upon the religious. Too often, neutrality acts not as a
constitutional standard, but some surreal examination driven by any number of
extrinsic circumstances, ad infinitum, from the typeface of a sign posted on
government property to the proximity of a monument to a government building. Far
from grounded in text, the standard becomes altogether separated from text, and
governed more by personal aesthetics than linguistics.
Souter’s concurring analysis in Weisman set forth his neutrality approach to the
Establishment Clause, and displayed an “all or nothing” rationale, where the
inclusion of any message or symbol with religious meaning, no matter how
350

Id. at 621 (citations omitted).

351

Id. at 629.
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denominationally neutral, would necessarily constitute government approval of
religion over non-religion, or even religion over agnosticism; deism over atheism;
belief over nonbelief.352
Souter also criticized what he identified as
“‘nonpreferential’ state promotion of religion.” 353 Nonpreferential promotion is an
oxymoron, if not a contradiction in terms. Promotion must involve advancement, to
advocate one idea to the exclusion of others. A nonpreferential promotion as such is
not a promotion at all. So something is either a promotion or it is not; if not a
promotion, it must be nonpreferential. If the aggressive separation requires the
absence of any religious idea, that becomes tantamount to promotion of irreligion,
which betrays neutrality. Amazingly, while Souter affirms that the “text of the
Clause” would not “readily permit” the adoption of a coercion test, he proceeds to
declare that “[n]or does the extratextual evidence of original meaning stand so
unequivocally at odds with the textual premise inherent in our existing precedent that
we should fundamentally reconsider our course.” 354 To Souter, while the “settled”
precedent did not always establish “perfectly straight lines,” such precedent “cannot,
however, support the position that a showing of coercion is necessary to a successful
Establishment Clause claim.355
Justice Souter’s analysis of the “extratextual evidence of original intent” results
in a conclusion not supported even by his own examination of that evidence. Justice
Souter argues the changes made to the subject of the Establishment Clause evince the
352
Of course, the Establishment Clause speaks of law, and speaks of establishment, and
not in terms of preferences, or inclusion, or acknowledgment. Furthermore, proscriptions
within the Constitution must be self-executing from the standpoint of being absolute: the
Establishment Clause either bars State action in a certain area or it doesn’t. Thus, given the
rationale found in the Court’s precedent, and Souter’s interpretation of it, no exception can be
made, such as in the motto “in God we trust,” or “under God,” no matter how ceremonial or
perfunctory the invocation of such phrases might be.

However, as neither practice is, in the proper sense, law, such practices are nevertheless
not barred. But the concept that any state action, pursued as a matter of tradition or ceremony
and not law (as in the case of Weisman), involving recognition of religion, or the religious,
somehow constitutes law as the framers understood the word “law” to mean, cannot be
reconciled with the approach taken by either the majority or the concurring opinions in
Weisman.
353

Id. at 612.

354

Id. at 618. Apart from failing to identify this inherent textual premise, the supposition
by Souter that “existing precedent” adhered to the clear text is, at best, unsustainable. The
precedent identified by Souter spoke of non-existent “walls of separation,” “entanglement,”
“endorsement,” subtle or indirect coercion, “symbolic union of church and state,” terms not
only “extratextual,” but supertextual, meaning, terms having replaced the text as the judicial
touchstone of decision. Id. at 609-31.
Furthermore, no precedent identified by Souter, or any of the majority in Weisman,
identified any textual premise, inherent or otherwise, with respect to what constitutes
“religion” for Establishment Clause purposes. In fact, all precedent and subsequent decisions
have presupposed religion by the existence of any trapping thereof, be it reference to an
“Almighty” or Divine providence, or a manger scene.
355

Id. at 619.
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Framers’ intent to make such proscription as broad as possible, to wit: changes in the
phraseology, from “establishment of a religion” or “establishing religion” to
“respecting an establishment of religion” required the Court to give the clause its
broadest prohibitive effect. However, while Justice Souter observes that earlier
versions of the clause employed even more imprecise terms than “respecting,” such
as “no laws touching religion,” he neglects to carry this logic forward to his
conclusion; if “respecting” is deemed a more precise term than “touching,” then ipso
facto, the framers meant just that, respecting. Respecting is itself a present
participle, meaning “on the subject of,” or “regarding.” Any clear reading of the
participial phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” would not include what
Justice Souter identifies as the “features and incidents of establishment.” 356
In Kiryas Joel, the majority expanded the neutrality rationale and identified any
perceived threat to government neutrality as one occurring not by virtue of the use
made of such benefit, but by the very according of the benefit, or as the majority
termed, the threat “at an antecedent stage.” 357 This conclusion lacks any
constitutional guidance. The Establishment Clause speaks nothing as to future
contingencies, or possibilities of future or contingent violations; nor has the Court
ever invalidated a law based on some future unknown act by a legislative authority,
one that may or may not adhere to the same standard of neutrality.358 In other words,
the Court’s neutrality analysis, and the linchpin of any Establishment Clause
violation based upon such analysis, hinges upon proving a negative, i.e., that the
legislature would in fact not act consistently to carve out special legislation when
faced with a comparable situation, be it a religious community or otherwise. 359
Because the majority determined that the benefit bestowed upon the village
“flow[ed] only to a single sect,” it felt constrained to conclude that the statute

356

Id. at 622.

357

Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 702-03.

358

This concern, if it be a concern at all, would perhaps more properly present an Equal
Protection argument, as it would also present, in such a form as stated by the majority, a
ripeness problem. However, see the dissent:
Making law (and making exceptions) one case at a time, whether through adjudication
or through highly particularized rulemaking or legislation, violates, ex ante, no
principle of fairness, equal protection, or neutrality simply because it does not
announce in advance how all future cases (and all future exceptions) will be disposed
of. If it did, the manner of proceeding of this Court itself would be unconstitutional.
It is presumptuous for this Court to impose—out of nowhere—an unheard-of
prohibition against proceeding in this manner upon the Legislature of New York State.
I have never heard of such a principle, nor has anyone else, nor will it ever be heard of
again.
Id. at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
359

See id. at 703-04. The proviso that government must act in a religiously neutral way, as
a constitutional touchstone, would not necessarily implicate the Establishment Clause at all if
the “future” community seeking special legislative treatment did so based on purely secular
considerations. For example, a community of environmentalists, existing as a municipal
subdivision, might be delegated powers such that it could operate schools powered entirely by
solar energy.
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violated the Establishment Clause. 360 In doing so, the majority was careful to
reiterate that the Constitution permitted, and even mandated, accommodation of
religion where the challenged law imposed special burdens upon the free exercise of
that religion. Despite recognizing the propriety of such accommodation in certain
instances, the Court also reiterated that an “unconstitutional delegation of political
power could [not] be saved as a religious accommodation.” 361 The fatal infirmity of
the New York statute lied in the fact that it singled out a particular sect for special
treatment, therefore violating the requirement of neutrality. 362
Kiryas Joel, perhaps better than any other case, highlights the dangers of adopting
super-textual approaches, and the always-accompanying specter of a result driven by
application of such to unusual fact patterns. For example, Justice Kennedy’s main
criticism of the state action arose from New York’s creation of the school district by
drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion. Kennedy’s concern would
appear to have greater weight if and when nonadherents would decide to relocate
within the Village of Kiryas Joel, where imposition of such legislation against
nonadherents would in fact meet all criteria of the Establishment Clause: a law, an
establishment, and a religion.363 However, the thrust of Kennedy’s opinion
concentrates more on the concept of religious accommodation than it does on
establishment; his criticism of the state action at issue involved the use of religion as
a criterion with which to draw political or electoral boundaries, and not the
establishment of the Satmar religion itself. 364
In Rosenberger, the Court applied neutrality to a “government benefits to
religion” case, where Establishment Clause scrutiny has traditionally fallen upon any
government program that benefits a religious group, or religion in general, or where

360

Id. at 705. Justice Blackmun noted as much in his brief concurrence, where he wrote
separately to express his “disagreement with any suggestion that today’s decision signals a
departure from the principles described in Lemon.” Id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
361

Id. at 706.

362

Id. at 706-07. The majority hinted that its holding did not foreclose other “alternatives”
for providing bilingual and bicultural special education to Satmar children that adhered to
neutral principles. This statement further demonstrates the Court’s rudderless approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, where it appears to impose a “strict scrutiny”/“narrowly
tailored” standard, as it would for violations of equal protection, or for content-based speech
restrictions.
363
Such a conclusion is difficult to ascertain in a vacuum, however, especially given the
concept of establishment mandated by law, where adherence is enforced or nonadherence
punished under penalty of law. Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
364

Kennedy’s analysis focused on similarity of future action with respect to neutrality;
however, it makes no mention that the electoral boundaries drawn by the statute affected only
the very religion targeted by the statute. See id. at 722-32. Thus, no coercion can exist where
there is no dissenting class to coerce—where all citizens of the challenged law are adherents,
no endorsement or coercion can, by definition, occur, and nor does that danger exist unless
and until nonadherents become subject to the law. The infirmity of the law at issue, then, lies
in its prospective application under as yet unascertained, and in large part unascertainable,
scenarios.
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religion or religious views are “implicated [to] some degree.” 365 In such cases, the
Court is mindful that in enforcing the Establishment Clause, it does not foreclose the
government from extending the same benefits to religious groups that are made
generally available to the public, without regard to religious belief. To this end, the
Court has required that such extension of benefits be based upon neutral principles or
criteria, and remain generally available based on such neutral principles
notwithstanding the fact that they aid or benefit religious groups or individuals. 366
However, in these types of cases, the Court has also recognized a “conflicting”
principle—that the extension of government benefits might conceptually reach such
a pervasive level or extent as to amount to an establishment of religion.
Resolution of these conflicting principles requires a line-drawing based on
particular facts; however, such line drawing must occur with reference to a fixed
point, that being the text of the Constitution. O’Connor’s concurrence in
Rosenberger surmised that such line drawing (which she equated to “careful
judgment”) is required when “two principles [(Free Exercise and Establishment)], of
equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree, come into unavoidable conflict.” 367
O’Connor’s “unavoidable conflict” comes not from the language of the First
Amendment, but from the multiple and inconsistent tests created to give them effect.
This being the case, the Court’s decision in Santa Fe represents the most muddled
and inconsistent Establishment Clause analysis the Court has ever undertaken, in
large part because the Court seemed to apply all of its crafted approaches, none to

365

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.

366

Id. This method of constitutional adjudication appears nearly incomprehensible when
measured against the actual text of the Establishment Clause. While extending financial or
other government benefits to one religion to the exclusion of others may necessarily precede
an establishment by law, or might be an aggregate indicia of such establishment, or must occur
in conjunction with an establishment, such availability, even if not neutrally applied, cannot of
itself constitute a law respecting an establishment because there is no accompanying free
exercise problem. All establishment problems must carry with them a concomitant free
exercise problem.
If neutrality, as an Establishment Clause requirement, prohibits government from taking
any action implicating anything religious, the Establishment Clause as written ceases to exist
as law. While an establishment perforce requires a government preference for religion or for a
particular religious belief (which, of course, would lack any neutrality at law), the reverse does
not, as a matter of logic, follow. Government preference on matters of religion, especially in
the realm of conceptual representations of larger ideals such as justice, equality, or morality
(be it government preference to have such ideal ethics, depicted in religious rather than secular
terms—be it displays of the Ten Commandments, the Beatitudes, or the writings of Augustine
over secular displays depicting the Greek goddess Themis, the writings of Aristotle, Justinian,
or Blackstone, or the text of The Laws of Solon, the Roman Twelve Tables, Hadrian’s Law, or
any other secular source of law or morality), or in the realm of recognition of religion’s
cultural or historical significance to the people of our nation (be it a government preference for
Christmas displays including religious themes of the nativity, or a Menorah, or with themes
relating to Kwanzaa, over the secular, commercialized Christmas displays of Santa Clause)
cannot of itself determine establishment because such preferences interfere with no aspect of
one’s private right to believe or disbelieve.
367

Id. at 849.
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the exclusion of the other. While at the outset of its opinion the Court cited Weisman
and its coercion approach, it proceeded to examine the school district’s policy of
student-led invocation as one “endorsing” religion; it also cited the district’s
“entanglement” with what it categorized as the “religious message” necessarily
involved in any “invocation.” The Court then reverted back to an endorsement
analysis, inquiring as to whether anyone present at the pre-game invocation (and
acquainted with the text of the policy, its history, and its implementation) would
perceive the student-led invocation as a school-approved prayer.368 Concluding its
jurisprudential vacillation, the majority undertook the coercion analysis with which it
began its opinion, concluding that the policy at issue had instigated an electoral
process where minority opinion on a religious issue—invocation—would necessarily
become subjugated to the majority will, thereby inviting coercion. The coercion thus
descended upon any minority present at such invocation occurred by virtue of the
natural desires and perceived social pressure to further school spirit, such as
attending football games, as well as the presence of students who may have no
choice but to be there—cheerleaders, band members, or the football players
themselves.369 Notwithstanding this, the majority nevertheless concluded that a
psychological coercive effect would descend on anyone actually present during the
invocation, even where their attendance was wholly voluntary.
The battle between history-and-traditions and neutrality that took place in Van
Orden and McCreary County demonstrates that neither test can accomplish
uniformity of application in the context of the Establishment Clause. Both Van
Orden and McCreary involved displays of religious symbology, i.e., the Ten
Commandments, on government property. Yet the Court reached diametrically
opposite results in each case. In Van Orden, the majority applied history and
traditions and found the display of the Ten Commandments permissible. 370 In
McCreary, the majority applied neutrality and invalidated the display. 371 The only
decisional significance emerging from these two cases appears to be that history-andtraditions would allow displays of the Ten Commandments, and neutrality would
not. However, the extent to which either test should, or would, be utilized in a
similar case remains elusive at best.
For example, Van Orden’s dissent, authored by Justice Stevens, reached a
determination that any preservation of “Jefferson’s metaphorical ‘wall of separation
between church and state,’” or of the similar concept of “wholesome neutrality,”
“create[s] a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public

368
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308. The majority rejected the district’s argument that the
invocation was simply a means to “solemnize” the sporting event, reasoning that the district
itself prescribed an “invocation” to occur, the nature of which would necessarily encompass a
prayer. Id. at 309.
369
Id. at 310-12. This analysis begs the question of whether any minority student would
feel psychological coercion occasioned by the state when deciding whether to join the football
team, cheerleading squad, or school marching band.
370

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.

371

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850-51.
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property,” and with respect to the Texas monument, mandated invalidation. 372 In
particular, the dissent felt that display of religious symbols on government property
creates an impermissible risk of offending nonadherents and adherents alike, thereby
encroaching the obligation to avoid divisiveness and exclusion in the religious
sphere, as compelled by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 373
Stevens thus indicated that the neutrality approach will pay scant deference to
history and tradition, other than to acknowledge its “strong role” in American
culture; in this respect, while delimiting the scope of the metaphorical wall would
not require governments to “hide works of art or historic memorabilia from public
view just because they also have religious significance,” the dissent categorized its
deference to tradition as of “marginal relevance” to a monument that served as
“official state endorsement of the message that there is one, and only one, God.” 374
Chiefly, Stevens found an overriding religious message from the fact that the
Decalogue constitutes the actual word of God, who demands worship of Him alone,
supreme above all other deities. 375 Stevens found equally disturbing the actual
version of the Ten Commandments used, which Stevens noted were not merely
semantic differences, but differences (such as for example, the Sixth
Commandment’s directive “thou shall not murder” versus “thou shall not kill”) upon
which different sects of Judaism or Christianity might vigorously disagree. 376
Display of such sectarian text—a step beyond display of a religious symbol—on
government property invokes not only a powerful presumption of invalidity, but in
fact “enhances the religious content of its message” as somehow the official message
of the State.377
Stevens also discounted various expressions recognizing a divine being made by
the Founding Fathers as constituting transient statements of each speaker’s
individual beliefs not necessarily imbued with government endorsement, whereas
“permanent placement of a textual religious display on state property . . .

372
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Here, the dissent effectively
elevates metaphor over text.
373

Id. at 709-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This approach presupposes a neutrality implicit
within the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses; however, as stated supra Part IV.A.3, any
textual reading of the Clauses reveals neutrality implicit if the Free Exercise Clause prohibits
any favoring of religion over irreligion, whereas the specific violation of Establishment
necessarily requires something more, the preference between particular religions, or specific
sects of a particular religion.
374

Id. at 711-12. One would wonder whether Texas’s posting of a replica of
Michelangelo’s “David” or da Vinci’s “Last Supper” would constitute “official state
endorsement” of Yahweh’s anointing on David as King, or of Jesus’ propitiatory atonement as
Messiah.
375

Id. at 716-17. Such declaration of supremacy and any perceived endorsement of
monotheism in general would be rejected not only by atheists, but presumably, by Hindus,
Buddhists, or adherents to ancient Greek mythology for that matter.
376

Id. at 717-18 n.16.

377
Id. at 721. The monument is, of course, a passive and silent monolith; its message is
static in nature in that it says the same thing as existed millennia ago.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

65

768

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:703

amalgamates otherwise discordant individual views into a collective statement of
government approval [that] never ceases to transmit itself to objecting viewers whose
only choices are to accept the message or to ignore the offense by averting their
gaze.”378 Moreover, these views, even if indicative of the Nation’s tradition as a
“religious people,” were nevertheless absent from the Constitution’s text, and if
taken selectively, “paint a misleading picture” as to the traditional role of religion in
public life.379
In the companion case of McCreary County, the majority, of which comprised the
dissent in Van Orden, applied neutrality to invalidate the display of the Ten
Commandments. The majority described its neutrality imperative as follows:
The prohibition on establishment covers a variety of issues from prayer in
widely varying government settings, to financial aid for religious
individuals and institutions, to comment on religious questions. In these
varied settings, issues of interpreting inexact Establishment Clause
language, like difficult interpretive issues generally, arise from the tension
of competing values, each constitutionally respectable, but none open to
realization to the logical limit.380
Apparently, the majority in McCreary settled upon neutrality as a reconciling
interpretive tool because “tradeoffs are inevitable, and an elegant interpretive rule to
draw the line in all the multifarious situations is not to be had.” 381 Thus, to the
majority, only the principle of neutrality remedied the “variety of interpretive
problems” of the concepts of Free Exercise and Establishment, and as such, “has
been helpful simply because it responds to one of the major concerns that prompted
adoption of the Religion Clauses.”382 The majority conceded that neutrality would
not provide precise guidance in all cases, could not resolve all marginal cases, nor
remove from doubt all the dubious trappings on infringement, but nevertheless
embraced neutrality as a “prudent way of keeping sight of something the Framers . . .
thought important.”383 It also dismissed the dissent’s reliance on historical evidence
378

Id. at 723.

379

Id. at 724. Stevens proceeded to identify “nonconforming sentiments” with respect to
the early colonists’s viewpoints regarding religious uniformity. See id. at 724-25 n.23-26.
380

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 875. This characterization borders on indecipherable. It
is also unclear which part of the Establishment Clause—all twelve words of it—is inexact.
381

Id.

382

Id. at 875-76. One may safely assume that the Framers were well aware of these
“major concerns” when they drafted the First Amendment. As well-educated men, and
deliberate drafters, they certainly would have included neutrality in the Amendment if
neutrality were the overriding goal—a sentence such as “Congress shall remain neutral in all
matters involving religion, and shall make no law preferring any religion over other religions,
or preferring religion over the absence of religion.” Indeed, had this been the text of the
Religion sentence, the Court’s multifarious tests might be more fitting a response to such
language; and actually, the tests adopted would support the proposition that such alternative
and “inexact” drafting had in fact occurred.
383

Id. at 876. Presumably, the Framers would have judges “keep in sight” the actual
language employed in the First Amendment as paramount and determinative. Furthermore,
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as to the Framers’ understanding as inconclusive at best: the majority discussed
evidence for both arguments: (1) that the principle of neutrality in Establishment
concerns perhaps exceed the Framers’ understanding of the clause, and (2) that
neutrality in fact comports with the Founders’ intent such as would invalidate even
government acknowledgment of religion. 384
With respect to the first argument, the dissent cited numerous instances in which
the Founders specifically referenced matters of religion, acknowledgement of a
deity, affirmation in the belief of a divine being, or assent to the reference to such
divinity ancillary to the conduct of government affairs/business.385 Given the case
history cited by the dissent, in which government extended or bestowed benefits
specifically to religion or only thereto—e.g., property tax exemptions (Walz), or
permitting students to leave public school for the purpose of receiving religious
instruction (Zorach)—the dissent concluded that any premise of absolute neutrality,
that government cannot favor religion over irreligion, as “demonstrably false.” 386 As
concerns government acknowledgment of religious belief in general, “it is entirely
clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits the
disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the
disregard of devout atheists”387 and that “[h]istorical practices thus demonstrate that
the citation from James Madison employed by the majority spoke of the “line of separation
between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid
collisions & doubts on unessential points,” when read in context of the entire letter, indicates
Madison’s concerns—as apparently spoken in the Rev. Adams’s sermon—as to monetary
support of religion by government. Id. See Letter from James Madison to Rev. Jasper Adams
(1832), reprinted in JOHN F. WILSON & DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: KEY DOCUMENTS, DECISIONS, AND COMMENTARY FROM THE PAST THREE
CENTURIES 75-77 (Westview Press 3d ed. 2003) (1965). Given Madison’s apparent concern
with the intermingling of religion and public money, one is left to wonder whether Madison,
in the context of this letter, would have considered the posting of the Ten Commandments on
the walls of courthouses as just such an “unessential point.” Nevertheless, the impetus of
Madison’s letter to the Rev. Adams concerned the government’s direct monetary support of
religion and not its passive recognition thereof.
384
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 877-78. The imperative of neutrality certainly provides
no self-explicating guidance, nor is it apparent on its face, but requires still further deviation
and separation from the textual requirement of establishment. Further, the neutrality imposed
requires, if nothing more, merely the inclusion of sufficient buffers within any display of
religiously-significant imagery, which merely dilutes all messages. An externally and
artificially created neutrality is not neutrality at all, but dilution. The majority acknowledged
this by its concession that the Constitution contained no textual definition of Establishment;
however, not only does neutrality cut a wider swath, it would be used to supplant explicit text
with something not implicit within it. See supra Part IV.A.3. As for the majority’s assertion
that “[n]o one contends that the prohibition of establishment stops at the designation of a
national [or a state] church” see McCreary County, at 875, 885-912 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
385

Id. at 886-89.

386

Id. at 891-93. These examples perfectly illustrate laws that violate the Free Exercise
Clause but do not violate Establishment.
387

Id. at 893. Public acknowledgments of the Almighty or God by definition disregard
polytheists or atheists, but do not violate the Establishment Clause. Our religious
acknowledgments may pay tribute to a Creator or a God, or to the Judeo-Christian tradition, so

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

67

770

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:703

there is a distance between acknowledgment of a single Creator and the
establishment of a religion.”388
With respect to the second argument, the dissent noted that neutrality “ratchets
up” Lemon’s hostility to religion by allowing for investigation into legislative
history, not for evidence of actual religious purpose itself, but rather as a means to
unearth evidence with which to ascertain the very appearance of government
purpose, to the reasonable observer, thereby allowing neutrality to be measured
against not actual intent, but by the opinion of a objective observer. Neutrality, then,
in essence allows a “heckler’s veto,” or a substitution of judgment where direct
evidence of purpose is nonexistent. Such a standard creates an “odd jurisprudence”
that “bases the unconstitutionality of a government practice that does not actually
advance religion on the hopes of the government that it would do so,” and one where
“the legitimacy of government action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the
misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials behind the
action had the intent to advance religion.” 389
The sum total of these latest opinions demonstrates that both models fail in that
they both require conclusions to be drawn based on perception. History-andtraditions produces fair disagreement among the men and women of the judiciary,
depending on the particular interpretive lens through which decisional rationale
emerges. Likewise, neutrality is also subject to the perception of the judiciary as
measured by a similar interpretive lens, through which, again, decisional rationale
emerges. Given the imprecision of such constitutional jurisprudence, and the judicial
temptation to substitute perception for sound judgment, the diametrically opposite
outcomes reached in Van Orden and McCreary become not only predictable, but a
foregone conclusion.
B. Grammatic and Linguistic Modality—A New Originalism
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.390
The “Establishment Clause,” as it is called, has suffered with this label. The
Establishment Clause is in fact not a clause at all, from the standpoint of grammar
and usage: it exists as one of two participial adjectival phrases contained within one
compound clause that might be more correctly called the “Religion Clause” of the

long as such acknowledgment does not advance that belief upon others or disparage
nonbelievers.
Our religious tradition presupposes monotheism, and thus, public
acknowledgment to God in that vein is valid. Id.
388

Id. at 894.

389

Id. at 901 (citation omitted).

390

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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First Amendment. As such, it is part of a single unit, and not one of two independent
and disparate clauses.391
Grammatically, then, the First Amendment consists of one independent clause:
“Congress shall make no law”; all parts that follow are, strictly speaking, adjectival
phrases, not clauses: the adjectival participial phrases “respecting an establishment of
religion” and “prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” separated by a comma and
joined by the conjunction “or,” form one singular unit, which I have termed the
“Religion Clause,” and both modify “law.” However, the remaining two adjectival
participial phrases also modify “law”: (1) Congress shall make no law “abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press,” which sets forth a second independent
prohibition as indicted by the semicolon that separates it from the following
prohibition, and (2) Congress shall make no law “[abridging] the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and [the right] to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.”392 From the standpoint of parallel sentence construction, these
adjectival participles—respecting, prohibiting, and abridging—appear as a series of
prohibitions in the same grammatical form, all modifying “law.” 393
Thus, the First Amendment, according to its parallel structure, as determined by
its three adjectival participles—respecting, prohibiting, and abridging—sets forth
three independent protections: protection against laws respecting an establishment of
religion and laws prohibiting free exercise of religion; protection against laws
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; and protection against laws
abridging the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances.
So grammatically, reference to an “Establishment Clause” and a “Free Exercise
Clause” within the First Amendment is not only incorrect, it also, erroneously, treats
them as separate, stand alone clauses. In reality, they are part of one larger “Religion
Clause” each affording not competing, but complementary and even supplemental
391

See, e.g., Carolyn A. Deverich, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and the
Free Exercise Dilemma: A Structural Unitary-Accommodationist Argument for the
Constitutionality of God in the Public Square, 2006 BYU L. REV. 211 (2006).
392

U.S. CONST. amend. I. Structurally, this portion of the First Amendment is somewhat
awkward, as the phrase “the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances” is also the object of the present participle “abridging,”
even though it is separated from its previous object, freedom of speech, etc., by a semi-colon,
not a comma (thereby indicating that it would stand apart as its own unit) and does not restate
the term “abridging” as would seem it should. However, grammatically, this third prohibition
as set forth after the second semicolon would make no sense within the First Amendment
unless that phrase were implied to relate back to “abridging” as well. Furthermore, the object
of the present participle “abridging” is “right,” with the two prepositional adjectival phrases
“to peaceably assemble” and “to petition the government for a redress of grievances” serving
as modifiers of the object, “right,” even though the word “right” is not restated with respect to
petitioning the government.
393
Parallel structure within a sentence is a coordinate structure in which all coordinate
parts are of the same grammatical form; in this instance, respecting, prohibiting, and abridging
appear in parallel form as present participles. As coordinate parts, they all relate back to the
same noun, “law,” with the same grammatical functions, i.e., participial modifiers. See
MARTHA KOLLN, UNDERSTANDING ENGLISH GRAMMAR 401 (4th ed. 1994).
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protections as they relate to “law.” Furthermore, to speak of the “tension of
competing values” (between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses) displays a
misunderstanding and misapplication of the grammatical structure of the Religion
Clause. This perceived tension, then, presents difficulty in implementation, unless
such clauses be read in pari materia, which is to say, within the entire contextual
structure of the First Amendment.
The two phrases “respecting an establishment of religion” and “prohibiting the
free exercise thereof” stand as adjectival phrases (in that they do not contain a
subject and a verb) written as present participles (“respecting” and “prohibiting”),
which as participial phrases both contain an object that relates back to the term each
modifies, those objects being “establishment” and “free exercise” (or more
accurately, “exercise,” with “free” serving as an adjectival modifier), respectively.
These two phrases then, grammatically, comprise a compound adjectival modifier of
“law.” The use of “thereof,” which relates back to “religion” as contained in the
previous phrase, indicates that the two are linked, and in fact, that the foregoing
“establishment” presents a subsisting prohibition more limited and precise than the
following “prohibiting”; if in such phrases were disjunctive or unconnected phrases,
the use of the pronominal adverb394 “thereof” in the free exercise portion would
become ambiguous, and as such, misplaced. Nor do these two phrases constitute the
predicate of the sentence; they do not complete the action of the verb “shall make”;
“law” completes the action. Therefore, the two phrases are merely adjectival
restrictive modifiers395 of law. The Religion Clause may properly be diagrammed as

394

In English, a pronominal adverb is formed in replacement of a preposition (“of”) and a
pronoun (“it”), which is a relative pronoun relating back to the noun (“religion”) by turning
the latter into a locative adverb (“there”) and the former into a prepositional adverb and
joining them in reverse order, hence “thereof.” See http://www.allwords.com/wordpronominal+adverb.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
395
A “restrictive modifier” serves as a modifier in a noun phrase (here, “law respecting an
establishment” and “[law] prohibiting the free exercise”) whose function is to restrict the
meaning of the noun (“law”). A modifier is restrictive when it is needed to identify the
referent of the headword (here, again, “law”). A restrictive modifier is never set off by
commas. See KOLLN, supra note 393, at 404.
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follows:396

Likewise, “law respecting” must have as its object “establishment,” i.e.
“respecting” what? In grammatical terms, “respecting an establishment of religion”
is one sub-unit of the Religion Clause, and any analysis must begin with the whole of
the clause and work backwards, thereby parsing its meaning from the sum of its
parts, but not merely constructing such meaning as simply the product of the sum of
its parts. As a present participial phrase, it serves in this respect as an adjectival
participial phrase, modifying “law.” “Establishment” is the object of the present
participle “respecting,” and the two cannot be separated—i.e., no analysis can be
done on the participle itself without including the object, establishment.
Furthermore, “law” effectively serves as the subject of the entire adjectival
phrase/restrictive modifier “respecting an establishment of religion” such that the
true “Establishment Clause” must read as “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.” While perhaps self-evident with respect to the language
of the First Amendment, judicial treatment has not demonstrated such understanding,
as the myriad tests developed to construe the Establishment phrase focus on the
singular concepts of “respecting” and “establishment,” rather than upon the phrase
“law respecting establishment of religion” as a single unit.”397
Similarly, “of religion” is an adjectival prepositional phrase modifying
“establishment,” such that any analysis of “establishment” cannot exclude or be done
in a vacuum absent inclusion therein of the term religion. None of these terms stand
alone. However, because they each modify the other individually and likewise as a
396
Gene Moutoux, Sentence Diagrams, One Way of Learning English Grammar:
Sentences from the United States Constitution, http://www.geocities.com/gene_moutoux/
diagramamend1.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
397

See KOLLN, supra note 393, at 186.
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unit serve as the restrictive modifier of “law,” one must approach the analysis as a
type of sine qua non approach where each element must be present: is there religion?
If so, is there an establishment? Likewise, establishment is determined not by vague
notions of “endorsement” or “entanglement,” but only with reference to “law;” and if
there be law, is it one respecting an establishment? True fidelity requires that any
establishment analysis must include all three concepts—law, establishment, and
religion—as these concepts comprise the entirety of the establishment portion of the
Religious Clause. Therefore, any proper textual analysis must encompass a twotiered approach, involving (1) the concepts of law, establishment, and religion as
they exist within the entirety of the Religion Clause, and (2) a sine qua non approach
that requires a finding of law, establishment, and religion as conjunctive, the absence
of any one of which would thus require a finding of constitutionality. The concepts
of “law” and “establishment” within the Establishment Clause necessarily involve
some form of legal favor or compulsion, where adherence or nonadherence to the
particular creed at issue (i.e., establishment) is rewarded, compelled, or punished,
respectively, through the granting of political favor, civil or criminal penalty, or
sanction, or through some form of compulsory taxation (i.e., law). However,
“respecting” must be construed not with reference to “religion,” but with reference to
“law,” such that a law respecting an establishment would necessarily involve a law,
the primary purpose of which is to establish religion, and not merely recognize, aid,
or promote religion in the general sense.
The primary weakness with all the Court’s attempts to fashion a decisional
standard lies in the fact that all analysis presupposes religion and focuses only on the
notion of establishment; and any analysis of “respecting” points not back to “law,”
but forward to “establishment.” Moreover, the tests so fashioned stop not at
establishment, but seek to ferret all perceived “steps toward” establishment. This
approach fails in that it misconstrues text. A law respecting an establishment of
religion cannot, from a textual and grammatical standpoint, become synonymous
with a practice that might be considered a step toward establishment. The Court’s
previous approaches appear to consider that the term “respecting” modifies
“establishment,” whereby establishment becomes a broadened concept, and a “near
miss” of establishment is nevertheless an establishment. Establishment as the object
of the participial phrase completes the phrase, it does not relate back to “respecting,”
but forward to “religion.” If the text of the Constitution stated, perhaps, that
“Congress shall make no law tending to respect an establishment of religion,” or one
“respecting a tendency toward the establishment of religion,” then their myriad tests
might prove closer to the mark. However, the Constitution does not say such things.
Respecting modifies and restricts “law,” i.e., a law respecting.
However, any clear reading of the text of the Establishment Clause indicates that
religion is also a “sine qua non” of the analysis; if the practice at issue is not religion,
then further analysis must end, without reference to any establishment
considerations. Religion is not synonymous with the general idea of God or what
may be considered as “religious” concepts—e.g., a graduation prayer, a moment of
silence, statues of religious symbols, or the inclusion of “intelligent design” in public
school curricula. Religious symbols may, and in fact do, serve as symbolic
expressions of concepts distinct from the religion from which they derive—concepts
of justice, liberty, compassion, generosity, patience, etc. Government would use
such symbols for the universal meaning contained therein, as perhaps expressed or
implied through their religious meaning in a context apart from their religious
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significance, much like it could use the expression of such concepts by secular
means, such as Hadrian’s Law, the writings of Epicurus or Kant, or Foucault’s
theories of correction and punishment.
This approach mirrors the jurisdictional approach in all federal courts, where, say,
the concept of subject matter jurisdiction must exist regardless of the merits of the
Plaintiff’s asserted claims. Or, from the standpoint of state actions sounding in
negligence, the elements of duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages all must
exist to maintain a tort action. So if there be no duty, there can be no breach and
proximate cause, and the action must fail regardless of the magnitude of damage.
As such, textual fidelity mandates the analysis to include all three nouns within
the clause: law, establishment, and religion. Textual fidelity also requires assigning
“hard” meaning to the terms “establishment” and “religion.” Establishment may be
the more ambiguous of the two, but neither escape conceptualization. Each
possesses certain immutable characteristics that courts may identify, and if any of
these identified characteristics be lacking, then neither can be said to exist.
Regarding “respecting,” the textual-linguistic approach makes clear the word itself
links “law” with “establishment.” Thus, for any establishment to exist, it must by
necessity involve the force of law, which may be thought of as the compulsion to act
or not act by the dictates of statute or regulation. Government can act in such a way
that might respect religion, but must always involve “law.” Regarding “religion,”
while it is true that religion in the specific sense may potentially encompass an
endless variety of embodiments, the term itself is not ambiguous in the general sense
of those characteristics that embody or define religion as a concept. Religion
promotes and establishes doctrine through canonical law and catechism. Religion
then espouses and enforces orthodoxy and demands adherence to such doctrine.
Religion often recognizes a hierarchy of authority. A de rigueur examination of the
term may reveal that religion mandates orthodoxy; religion entails doctrine; religion
espouses creeds.398 Religion preaches an identifiable and specific message, adheres
to the teachings of a particular individual or group of individuals,399 and may
venerate manifestations of divine beings,400 often collected in some sacred work or
text.401 Religion may recognize some form of the afterlife involving reward or
punishment, nonbeing, or reincarnation, and often requires official days of
observation or observance. 402 Moreover, these terms must be understood within the
parameters of their context within the entire Religion Clause, first and foremost;
these parameters exist by virtue of the Clause’s grammatical structure, which can
only be gleaned through the rules of grammar and usage.
This exegesis comports with current Supreme Court jurisprudence. In District of
Columbia v. Heller, the Court engaged in Second Amendment analysis employing a
398

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

399

E.g., Jesus, Moses, Mohammed, Buddha, St. Paul, John Smith, etc. Even nontraditional
or “new age” forms of religion, such as Scientology (L. Ron Hubbard) or Unification Church
(Sun Myung Moon), adhere to this principle.
400

E.g., God, Christ, Jehovah, Allah, Zeus, Vishnu, Isis, Zoroaster, etc.

401

E.g., The Torah, the Gospels, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, etc.

402

E.g., Christmas, Easter, Passover, Ramadan, etc.
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linguistic approach as an interpretive principle in constitutional adjudication: “[W]e
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by
the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.”403 In fact, in Heller, the Court endeavored to
break down the various subparts of the Second Amendment, separately analyzing
each clause (or phrase as the case may be) within the overall context of the entire
structure of the Amendment. This approach is altogether proper, for it limits
constitutional interpretation to the rules of English grammar—the rules that bound
the Framers at the time of drafting—and thereby renders no word or phrase therein
redundant or surplusage, further preventing subjugation and textual supplantation. In
this way, then, grammatical exegesis allows for the application of original text as
written to the various situations presented by modern society, where any “evolution”
of the text occurs only by application of that text within the confines of the grammar.
As such, this approach also serves the essential function of binding judges to these
rules: judges, as bound by the text, may interpret the text but may not stray from it.
Any decision based on a provision of the Constitution must remain within the
confines of that provision and must rest upon the precise language contained therein.
This binding of judges further limits the capricious nature of the judiciary,
preventing it from supplanting text with its own changing theories of modernity;
concomitantly, it allows text to evolve while disallowing the evolution of perceived
concepts (such as “religious liberty” embodied in the Religion Clause) that any
particular judge or justice might “discover” in the Constitution. This permits the
evolution of text, as opposed to the evolution of perceived but unstated principles
“implicit” therein, whether they be notions of “liberty” apart from its context within
the Due Process Clause or “implied” fundamental rights. 404
This grammatical approach best preserves the original language of the First
Amendment. And not only does it foster the required fidelity to the text of the
Amendment; it ensures it, because it frames the text in linguistic norms and rules that
bound the Framers, thereby best evidencing original meaning. If the Constitution be
interpreted, such interpretation must occur within the confines of the document itself,
and the explicit provisions contained therein, and those words immutably embodied
in the document.
When read against this backdrop, and when interpreting the entirety of the
Religion Clause in accordance with the rules of grammar and usage, a new
constitutional “linguistic modality” emerges.
Far from becoming dissonant
“clauses” that set forth competing rights, or conflicting protections, the Religion
phrases exist in an entire continuum of one independent Religion Clause that defines
complementary rights as they both relate back to the object they modify, “law.” This
approach renders the Religion Clause uniform, achieves harmonization, and affirms
the unity of the establishment and free exercise protections, in that, as stated supra,
they both serve as restrictive modifiers of the same object, “law.” In this respect,
removal of the phrases leaves the simple sentence “Congress shall make no law”; the
absence of these phrases thus renders an absurd meaning, as Congress’s very purpose
403

See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).

404
Any substantive evolution of constitutional principles can only and properly occur by
amendment, as stated supra note 7.
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is to make law. As such, these two phrases are harmonized by their relationship to
the common noun they modify, “law,” because as restrictive modifiers of “law”—
necessary to identify the noun they modify, a “law respecting an establishment” and
a “law prohibiting the free exercise” of religion—they must achieve harmony, not
dissonance, within the parameters of the Religion Clause.
The majority in McCreary believed it could only reconcile the entirety of the
Religion Clause through the imposition of a neutrality standard with respect to
establishment. Neutrally-applied benefits or aid to religion, the refusal of which
might lead to free exercise concerns, will accommodate free exercise but not
constitute establishment, only so long as the provision of benefits is based on neutral
criteria. This is nonsense. It is also, linguistically, impossible. Neutrality to religion
cannot be determinative of both phrases, as these phrases, read together as part of a
single clause, complement and qualify each other; they do not compete, and are not
in tension. One provision must afford a broader protection than the other, otherwise
the inclusion of both would have been redundant, and one mere surplusage. Because
a free exercise violation can exist independent of an accompanying establishment
violation, but an establishment violation, by its very nature, cannot exist without an
accompanying free exercise violation, the protections afforded by free exercise must
encompass more than those of establishment. Therefore, the threshold for a free
exercise problem must be less than that of an establishment violation, and for this
reason, the standard for establishment must be more restrictive, or more narrow, visà-vis free exercise. In other words, the protections afforded against establishment
subsist with the protections afforded free exercise, such that, by necessity, a former
violation cannot exist without a violation of the latter, but the latter can exist in the
absence of the former.
Within the Religion Clause, a linguistic modality emerges that clarifies the dual
phrases contained therein, and the protections they afford. When read in
conjunction, the “respecting establishment” and “prohibiting free exercise” phrases
clarify the other, as they are dual modifiers of their object, law. As such, they cannot
be seen as mutually exclusive or in any way competing. In fact, this linguistic
modality indicates that free exercise must clarify establishment, in that the existence
of one violation presupposes the existence of the other as well, but not vice-versa.405
405

In linguistics, modals are expressions broadly associated with notions of possibility and
necessity. Modals have a wide variety of interpretations which depend not only upon the
particular modal used, but also upon where the modal occurs in a sentence, the meaning of the
sentence independent of the modal, the conversational context, and a variety of other factors.
For example, the interpretation of an English sentence containing the modal “must” can be
that of a statement of inference or knowledge (roughly, epistemic) or a statement of how
something ought to be (roughly, deontic). This interpretation of the Clauses conforms with a
type of modal ontology, or a type of ontological dependence, where two or more things,
conditions, or facts exist, one of which is a classification of the other, and may not exist
without the other, but not vice versa. In terms of logic, heat can exist in the absence of fire,
but not vice versa—heat always exists in the presence of fire, but fire does not always exist in
the presence of heat. In constitutional terms, the specific prohibition against Establishment
exists alongside the general protection against the prohibition of Free Exercise, where
infringement upon Free Exercise may exist without a violation of the Establishment Clause,
but not vice versa; i.e., a violation of the Establishment Clause cannot exist without a violation
of the Free Exercise Clause.
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Any other analysis renders the free exercise clause redundant. How? Because if the
Founders intended establishment protections to encompass the outermost limits of
Religion Clause protections, inclusion of free exercise would have been redundant,
because one would necessarily encompasses the other. By its inclusion as an
additional, and not separate, protection (no semicolon separates establishment and
free-exercise; the speech protections in the First Amendment, separated by a
semicolon, are clearly separate from the religion protections) within the Religion
Clause, free exercise must constitute a broader protection than establishment, a
prohibition to protect against legislative acts that might limit the practice of religion
without necessarily requiring adherence to one established orthodoxy. Since
establishment must prohibit free exercise, establishment occurs first within the
Religion Clause, such that if establishment be found, the Religion Clause is violated;
however, because free exercise encompasses a broader, more inclusive proscription,
free exercise concerns may exist independent of establishment clause concerns, such
that the free exercise phrase follows the establishment phrase, whereby a law not
violating the establishment phrase may yet violate the free exercise phrase and
thereby violate the Religion Clause.
Now it might fairly be asked that if an establishment violation always involves a
free exercise violation, why include a separate free exercise protection? Or even,
why have a separate establishment prohibition? If the analysis begins and ends with
a free exercise analysis, and if all violations of establishment involve prohibitions
against free exercise, why not simply look to see if free exercise is infringed, or look
to see if establishment is infringed, which would in turn determine a free exercise
breach? Impossible. Each affords complementary but distinct protections. To assert
that the two phrases provide competing protections, where the tension exists in that
the furtherance of one protection approaches the violation of the other, suggests that
(1) the drafters somehow did not understand the English language, and (2) in some
fashion, the Framers did not comprehend that situations could arise where Free
Exercise would be implicated where Establishment would not.
Because of this relationship, the government can never claim that efforts to
accommodate a religious exercise—such as allowing for reimbursement of printing
costs for a Christian-based newspaper, as in Rosenberger—might at some level
threaten establishment. Allowing for the payment of costs for printing of a Christian
newspaper, even if not neutrally applied, in no way threatens free exercise, and in
this sense, can never threaten establishment. Conversely, the denial of benefits based
on religion will always implicate free exercise, and thus have the potential, if such
denial becomes (1) systematically oppressive, and (2) targeted at a particular religion
or belief, to implicate establishment. This conclusion flows from the understanding
that two phrases provide complementary, albeit independent, protections.
The protections afforded by establishment and free exercise thus exist within two
distinct but interrelated “spheres” whereby the protections afforded by the
establishment phrase exist within one sphere, that sphere subsisting within the
broader sphere of free exercise. In this way, then, establishment and free exercise
cannot “compete” in any way, and an accommodation of free exercise can never
result in a violation of establishment, because free exercise concerns always
accompany establishment concerns. Moreover, because establishment concerns
never exist once a free exercise violation is found lacking, and because establishment
protections are more restrictive than those afforded free exercise, neutrality and
accommodation analyses become irrelevant to any establishment examination.
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An illustrative Venn diagram406 of this subsistence would appear as:

In terms of the relationship of the two protections—outer sphere (free exercise)
and inner sphere (establishment)—one exists as a subsistent protection within the
other, or in other words, as an absolute prohibition, or more deeply imbedded right
within a more expansive right. Therefore, if establishment be threatened, free
exercise has already been violated. For example, the government might pass a law
patently discriminatory to one particular religion, or a law hostile towards outward
displays of that religion—say, a law banning the use of bumper stickers with
Christian messages, under the guise of the state’s regulatory authority over the
licensure and operation of motor vehicles. Leaving aside any equal protection
arguments, such a law, while demonstrating clear hostility to religious messages, or
particular strands thereof, establishes nothing, and does not respect the establishment
of anything other than hostility. Such law does however, display (1) a lack of
neutrality, (2) a purpose directly related to religion, (3) the effect of inhibiting a
religious exercise, and (4) the coercive prohibition under penalty of law—thus
bearing all the hallmarks of the Court’s different establishment models. Yet, while
the law does not implicate establishment, it clearly implicates free exercise.

406

Venn diagrams depict through the use of concentric and intersecting circles, all logical
relations hypothetically possible between some finite collection of sets and the terms of
propositions by the inclusion, exclusion, or intersection of the circles; in the case of the
possible propositions included with establishment and within free exercise problems, the
circles representative of each set would have some logical relation to the other, as depicted by
the intersection of such circles. See http://mathworld.wolfram.com/VennDiagram.html.
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If such be the case, then in no way can any establishment analysis “eviscerate”
the protections afforded free exercise—be it by requiring neutrality, coercion, or
endorsement. Since establishment necessarily involves official sanction, then such
sanction must occur at the expense or to the detriment of what is not sanctioned, or
what falls outside the establishment. Conversely, if no threat exists to free exercise,
then no threat can possibly exist as to establishment.
V. CONCLUSION
Proper constitutional interpretation must involve sound methodology with a fixed
point of reference. This methodology must begin and end with the textual language
so construed, with analysis guided by the rules of grammar and usage inherent within
the document. Foremost, this creates and sustains a constitutional jurisprudence
founded upon clear, unwavering, and workable standards, by which courts may
decide Establishment issues, and safeguards the primacy of the Constitution and the
judicial adherence thereto. The development of a standard that operates within the
confines of the rules of grammar and usage does not preclude a fact-intensive
analysis that may be required in any given case. While facts always vary, the
standard must not. Textual standards allow for unwavering decisional guidance
within which the facts operate, maintain uniformity and consistency of application,
and provide solid guidance to lower courts, legislators, and attorneys alike.
Because the tripart approach in Lemon, as well as the concepts of endorsement,
coercion, and to a certain extent, neutrality, have all employed super-constitutional
principles and surrogate concepts, they fail as constitutional standards. More
importantly, they involve concepts that implicate free exercise analysis as well.
Using a linguistic modality approach, as governed by the rules of grammar and
usage, the test for establishment cannot be intermingled with free exercise analysis,
because a free exercise violation can exist notwithstanding the absence of an
establishment concern. Therefore, any discussion of establishment must involve a
more extreme analysis as appropriate to its subject, that being, the punishment of
dissent. In other words, the modality of the two clauses would presuppose a free
exercise violation where an establishment violation exists. If a passive Christmas
display depicting the manger scene to the exclusion of secular material would not
implicate free exercise, it could never constitute an establishment, or a law
respecting one. Far from becoming an establishment problem, the manger scene,
even if “endorsing” the Christian aspects of the holiday, would remain
constitutionally harmless.
Likewise, a “history-and-traditions” approach is equally unworkable. History
and tradition, while certainly illustrative, cannot provide a clear standard, because
this history and these traditions only acquire relevance and meaning as seen through
the eyes of the present, and any such perception must always be subject to the
particularities of the lens through which they are viewed. As such, history-andtraditions become, from a constitutional standpoint, “[A] poor player / That struts
and frets his hour upon the stage / And then is heard no more; it is a tale / Told by an
idiot, full of sound and fury / Signifying nothing.”407 The primary weakness with the

407
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5; see also Psalms 90:9 (King James)
(“For all our days are passed away in thy wrath: we spend our years as a tale that is told.”).
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history/traditions approach becomes its own brittleness, its own subjective character,
and the capricious and contradictory interpretations of its audience, where selective
borrowing from historical documents or traditions leads to hopelessly inconclusive
or even contrary results. Neutrality analysis fails because, given the modality of the
Religion Clause itself, such an approach creates inconsistency between the
Establishment and Free Exercise phrases of the Religion Clause.
The rules of grammar and usage—modern linguistics—bear no such frailty, and
must serve as the constitutional benchmark out of which emerges constitutional
interpretation. Laws respecting establishment of religion remain that which are
prohibited, and would require (1) law, and if there be a law, then the law (2)
respecting establishment, and if it be a law respecting establishment, then (3) a
determination of what is established. Therefore, endorsement, effect, or coercion,
psychological or otherwise, become irrelevant as constitutional guides. If the display
of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse, even if by law, does not respect
an establishment of Judaism, by requiring adherence to the tenets of that faith, the
display does not implicate the Establishment Clause, even if such a display might be
a patent governmental preference for a depiction of Mosaic law over that of Solon.
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